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I[I]
A buy-out of a shareholder's stock is a sale of his stock holdingsin a specific corporation pursuant to a pre-exi ting c ntract.
In recent years such arrangements have, deservedly, become an in-
creasingly popular planning device for shareholders in closely held
corporations; they make it possible to limit the class of potential
shareholders, provide liquidity for the estate of a deceased share-
holder, and establish a value for stock which has no active market.
There are two popular categories of buy-out plans. If the pro-
spective purchaser of a decedent's shares is the corporation that
issued them, the plan is called an "entity purchase" plan, a "stock
retirement" plan, or a "stock redemption" agreement. If the sur-
viving shareholders are to purchase the decedent's stock, the plan
is referred to as a "cross-purchase" agreement. A given plan may
combine both types by providing that the corporation will redeem
some of the shares and that the surviving shareholders will purchase
the remainder.
Although it may be desirable in certain circumstances that a
buy-out be optional on the part of either the purchaser or the seller,1
a mandatory agreement will usually be more appropriate. The focus
of this Article is on mandatory agreements taking effect upon the
death of a shareholder.2 Arrangements for a buy-out should, ideally,
be prepared when a corporation is formed. In any event, an arrange-
ment is likely to be fairer to all the parties when it is made before
the death of a shareholder, since each shareholder is then uncertain
as to whether he will be the survivor or the first to die. In the
preparation of such an agreement, various tax and corporate law
consequences must be anticipated, and other nontax considerations
must be weighed. The purpose of this Article is to delineate some
of the most important tax and corporate law considerations and to
examine various methods of financing buy-outs. It will place par-
1. For example, when a corporation has made an election under subchapter S (INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-78), the corporation may wish to have the option to pur-
chase the stock of a deceased shareholder so that it can protect its election, but it may
not wish to be compelled to make the purchase, See D. KAHN, BASIc CORPORATE TAXA-
TION 296-315.
2. Usually, it will also be desirable to impose restrictions on the inter vivos transfer
of stock by a shareholder, since a buy-out which is mandatory at death will not in it-
self prevent a third party from purchasing the shareholder's stock before his death.
In order to restrict such transfers effectively, certain procedures must be carefully ob-
served. See notes 184-97 infra and accompanying text. Inter vivos restrictions may also
be imposed by providing that the purchasers under the buy-out agreement have rights
of first refusal during the shareholder's life.
Quite often a buy-out agreement will not be conditioned on death alone, but will
also provide for the mandatory or optional purchase of a shareholder's stock during
his life if he retires or becomes disabled. For an analysis of this type of arrangement, see
Note, A Closer Look at Disability "Buy-Outs" for the Close Corporation, 52 MINN. L.
Rrv. 483 (1967).
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ticular emphasis on the merits and disadvantages of funding by
means of life insurance.
I. THE DEsIRABILrrY OF BUY-OUT AGREEMENTS
Buy-out agreements generally have two basic goals: the conver-
sion of the decedent's interest in a closely held business into liquid
assets and the prevention of the disposition of the decedent's stock
to outside interests. The first of these serves the purposes of the
deceased shareholder and his beneficiaries; the second primarily
benefits the corporation and the continuing shareholders.
A. The Needs of the Decedent's Estate
When the amount of a decedent's gross estate3 is substantial, but
a major part of his estate is represented by stock holdings in a
closely held corporation, the executor often has difficulty obtaining
sufficient liquid assets to satisfy the decedent's outstanding debts and
to pay both the administrative expenses of the estate and the death
taxes imposed by federal and state governments. A buy-out plan can
ensure that the decedent's stock will be convertible into liquid assets
when that is most necessary. That assurance of liquidity may be
important to the shareholders in their personal estate planning.
The following example may be useful:
I-A-1. X, a widower, and his brother, Y, each owns 50% of the stock
of Widgets, Inc. X dies leaving a taxable estate of $1,000,000. X's
50% interest in Widgets is valued at $910,000; the proceeds of his
life insurance are $120,000; the aggregate value of his other stocks
and securities and bank accounts is $30,000. The remainder of his
assets was used in satisfying his outstanding debts. The estate tax
liability owing on X's death (ignoring state death taxes and funeral
expenses) is $325,700 and the liquid assets available total only
$150,000. The $175,500 balance must be obtained from the Widget
stock, but the executor is likely to have difficulty selling a minority
interest in a closely held corporation. The executor might seek to
have the corporation redeem part of X's stock, but if Y refuses to
cooperate with a redemption or if the parties cannot agree on the
redemption price, the estate could be embarrassed.
Had X and Y anticipated this problem and executed a manda-
tory buy-out agreement prior to X's death, those difficulties would
have been avoided. Two compatible co-investors, neither of whom
knows which will survive, will probably reach an agreement on a
3. As used herein, the term "gross estate" refers to a decedent's gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes. This encompasses far more than a decedent's probated estate.
For example, insurance proceeds and jointly held property may be included in the
decedent's gross estate even if they are excluded from his probated estate. See INT. Ray.
Conz of 1954, I§ 2040, 2042,
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redemption plan and a valuation formula more readily than will a
surviving shareholder and the executor of a decedent.
To guarantee liquidity for a shareholder's estate, the prospective
purchaser must be obligated to purchase the decedent's stock, but
the decedent's estate need not be required to sell. Liquidity is not
always essential, since payment of federal estate taxes can sometimes
be deferred.4 Nonetheless, it is wise to plan in such a manner as to
ensure that there will be sufficient liquidity in case that should be-
come necessary.
Furthermore, there are other sound reasons favoring a buy-out
plan. A shareholder may prefer that the investment portfolio for his
beneficiaries concentrate on security rather than on yield, and an
investment in the corporation's business may not conform with that
desire. For the same reason, the shareholder may wish to have his
holdings diversified after his death, and that would require that
his executor disengage his estate from the corporate business. The
disadvantages of retaining a major portion of the decedent's estate
in an investment in a closely held business are aggravated if the
interest constitutes a minority share of" the corporation, since there
is a risk that the surviving shareholders will engage in oppressive
tactics, such as increasing their salaries as corporate employees and
reducing or eliminating dividends. Thus, the decedent's widow or
surviving children may be "starved out" of the corporation and
forced to sell at a sacrifice. 5 The development of a deadlock between
the decedent's widow and the other shareholders may also prove
unfortunate and should be avoided.6 By the use of a buy-out agree-
ment, the disadvantages which often attend the bequest of shares in
a closely held corporation may be minimized.
In some circumstances, however, a shareholder might desire that
his interest in the closely held corporation be retained after his
death. The earnings of the corporation may provide a substantially
higher yield than the shareholder's widow would otherwise obtain,
and the shareholder may have confidence in the stability of the
business of the corporation. If the corporation is owned by one
family, the shareholder may be confident that his widow will be
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6166. If the estate does not comply with the objective
standards for deferral provided by § 6166, it can still obtain a deferral under § 6161
(a)(2) as long as the executor can demonstrate that immediate payment would im-
pose an undue hardship.
5. For a comprehensive treatment of the many techniques available to majority
shareholders for squeezing out a minority shareholder, see F. O'NEAL & J. DERwIN, Ex-
PULSION OR ORESSION OF BUSINESS AssocIATEs: "SQuErz-Ours" IN SMALL ENTERPRISFS
(1961).
6. See 2 F. O'NLAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.06 (1958).
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treated equitably by the other shareholders. Nevertheless, even close
family members have been known to become enemies; and if a
deceased shareholder's interest is not to be purchased, it will prob-
ably be desirable to provide at least for its conversion on death into
an investment form that will maximize the widow's security, such
as preferred stock or debentures which provide the holder with sub-
stantial or even exclusive voting rights in the event of a default in
dividends or interest.7
A final advantage of a mandatory buy-out agreement is that the
purchase price set in the agreement, whether it be a fixed dollar
amount or one which is determined by means of a formula, may
establish the value of the stock for estate tax purposes.8 For this re-
sult, the following conditions must be met: (1) the decedent's estate
must be obligated to sell; 9 (2) the agreement must prohibit the
shareholder from disposing of the stock during his life without first
offering it to the prospective purchaser or purchasers at the contract
price; 10 and (3) the purchase price must have been established
through an arm's-length business bargain.1 In the case of family
7. Such an arrangement, however, may not be sufficient to prevent a squeeze-out.
The majority shareholders might cause a merger or recapitalization of the corporation
resulting in the elimination or dilution of the widow's protection. For a discussion of
the means of protecting minority shareholders, see F. O'NAL & J. DERwiN, supra
note 5; O'Neal, Arrangements Which Protect Minority Shareholders Against "Squeeze-
Outs," 45 MINN. L. Rav. 537 (1961).
8. See Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1936); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958);
Rev. Rul. 59-60, § 8, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 237, 243-44.
9. See United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962); Estate of Orville B.
Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acq., 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 5. When the decedent's executor is
required to sell only upon the corporation's exercise of an option to buy, the purchase
price established in the option agreement will control the estate tax valuation if the
other tests are satisfied. Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938); Wilson
v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932). A mandatory buy-out, however, is a safer ar-
rangement, particularly when the shareholders are members of the same family. If the
decedent's estate has an option to sell, subject to the requirement that the executor
first offer the stock to the corporation at a set price, the agreement does not impose
sufficient restrictions on the sale of the stock to fix the valuation thereof since the
executor need not sell at all. But the obligation to offer the stock to the corpora-
tion at a given price before making a sale may depress the market value of the stock.
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943). See C.
LOWNDFS & R. KRANE R, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gir" TAXEs 484-91 (2d ed. 1962) for an
excellent discussion of restrictive agreements.
10. Estate of Robert R. Gannon, 21 T.C. 1073, 1080 (1954) (holding that the value
of a partnership interest was not determined by a purchase agreement which did not
restrict sales during the partner's life); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958); Rev. Rul. 59-
60, § 8, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 237, 243-44. If the agreement provides the purchasers with
first refusal rights at the contract price during the shareholder's life, that should be
sufficient. Broderick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d
396 (2d Cir. 1952). An agreement which is binding only during the shareholder's life,
however, does not fix the value of the stock. United States v. Land, 503 F.2d 107 (5th
Cir. 1962); Mathews v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
11. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958); Rev. Rul. 59-60, § 8, 1959-1 Cum. BULL.
257, 243-44.
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corporations, the last condition may require that the purchase price
be reasonable as determined in light of the potential growth of the
business at the date the buy-out agreement is executed. 12 Thus, a
significant advantage of establishing the stock's estate tax valuation
through a buy-out agreement is that it avoids the "horse-trading"
negotiations which frequently attend a dispute with the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) over the value of closely held stock.
It appears, then, that a buy-out agreement will usually be de-
sirable for a deceased shareholder's estate. But such arrangements are
not free from risks. One of the most troublesome is the possibility
that a stock redemption will be deemed essentially equivalent to
a dividend and taxed as such.13 Because of the attribution rules,' 4
12. The requirement of an arm's-length bargain creates uncertainties since that
test is somewhat subjective; when the agreement is made among compatible family
members, the best evidence usually available to demonstrate an arm's-length dealing
is the reasonableness of the purchase price established in the agreement. See Slocum v.
United States, 256 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), holding that when there was a business
justification for an agreement at the date of execution, that agreement established the
estate tax value of the shares, notwithstanding the parties' failure to amend the agree-
ment to reflect a subsequent rise in value of the shares (from $100 per share to more
than $1,100 per share) at least when the agreement was executed prior to the enact-
ment of the estate tax. In Estate of Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acq., 1959-2
Com. BuLL. 5, the court sustained an agreement among shareholders who were members
of the same family because there was a business purpose for the agreement, namely, to
maintain the control of the present management. A surprising taxpayer success on this
issue is May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952), in which the court held that
because the formula in the buy-out agreement resulted in a payment of zero for the
decedent's stock, the estate tax value of the stock was also zero. In May, although the
decedent was the father of the purchaser, the court found valid business considerations
for the agreement in that the son had guaranteed repayment of a large debt of the de-
cedent. While May is a significant case, it would still be prudent for planning pur-
poses to establish a fair price for the stock that is subject to the purchase agreement.
See Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest in a Closely Held
Business (pt. Il1), 46 IowA L. Rv. 516, 567-69, 572 (1961).
13. IN-r. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(d). The net effect of a redemption of a share-
holder's stock may bear greater resemblance to a dividend than to a purchase of the
stock, and, if so, it is treated accordingly. For example, assume that A owns sixty of the
one hundred outstanding shares of stock of the X corporation and B owns the other
forty shares. X has sizeable earnings and profits. X redeems thirty shares of A's stock for
$30,000 and twenty shares of B's stock for $15,000. Since, both before and after the
redemption, A and B owned respectively 60% and 40% of X, the only significant altera-
tion made by the "redemption" was that $45,000 cash was withdrawn from the corpora-
tion. Thus, it is likely that the putative "redemption" will be treated as the distribution
of a dividend. The criteria for determining whether or not a stock redemption con-
stitutes a dividend are intricate and should be studied carefully. For an analysis of
this question, see B. BITTrER & J. EuSTicE, FEDERAL INcOrE TAXATION OF CORPOIWLTION,
AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 7 (2d ed. 1966); D. KAHN, supra note 1, ch. I. In addition, if
the surviving shareholders are obligated to purchase the decedent's shares, and if the
corporation redeems those shares in their stead, thereby discharging the obligation, the
redemption will constitute a dividend to the surviving shareholders. C. LOWNDOS & R.
KRAMER, supra note 9, at 875.
14. The attribution rules provide that when stock is nominally owned by or for
one individual or entity, it will be considered as owned by certain other closely related
individuals or entities as well. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 318. It would be unrealistic to
[Vol. 68:1
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this possibility exists even if all of a decedent's stock is redeemed.
However, to the extent that a redemption qualifies under section
303 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), the distributions to the
shareholders do not constitute dividends, and when the benefits of
that provision are available, they often prove too valuable to forgo.15
While a cross-purchase plan is not subject to this difficulty, it creates
other problems which are discussed later.
There is a further danger if the purchase price fixed in the buy-
out agreement is not treated as determinative of the value of the
stock. 6 If the amount distributed by the corporation in payment
for the stock is deemed greater than the stock's value, the excess will
not constitute a distribution in redemption of the stock, and conse-
quently will not be protected by section 303 or 302(a)17 of the Code.
examine the net effect of a stock redemption solely from the viewpoint of the share-
holders whose stocks were redeemed, without accounting for the stockholdings of closely
related persons. Accordingly, in determining whether a stock redemption constitutes a
dividend, the rules of attribution embodied in § 318 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) are usually applied. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(c). For example, if C and D
each owns 50% of the outstanding stock of the Y Corporation, and if the Y Corporation
redeems all of C's stock, the redemption is completely disproportionate as between the
two shareholders and, therefore, will usually be treated as a purchase of C's stock rather
than as a dividend distribution. If C and D are husband and wife, however, it might
be more accurate to view their stockholdings as combined in a single family unit;
in that event, the redemption would not be disproportionate to any extent. Under
§ 318(a)(1) of the Code, a shareholder's stock will be attributed to his or her spouse
and treated as if the latter also owned it. Consequently, if C's wife owns all the remaining
shares, the redemption of G's stock will usually constitute a dividend. Nevertheless, in
certain circumstances, defined in § 302(c)(2) of the Code, the attribution rules are dis-
regarded. For a discussion of the attribution rules established by § 318, see B. BrrrERx
& J. EusricE, supra note 13, at 280-84; D. KAHN, supra note 1, ch. I.
15. Section 803 of the Code provides that if certain conditions are satisfied, the re-
demption of stock which was included in the gross estate of a decedent will be treated
as a purchase rather than as a dividend. The benefits of § 803 can be claimed for only
that amount of stock which is equal to the sum of the decedent's federal and local
death taxes and the administrative and funeral expenses that were allowable as federal
estate tax deductions for the decedent's estate. The administrative and funeral expenses
need only be allowable deductions; it is not required that they actually be deducted.
To qualify, the estate tax valuation of the redeeming corporation's stock that is
included in the decedent's gross estate must exceed either 35% of the value of the de-
cedent's entire gross estate or 50% of his taxable estate. If stocks of each of two or
more corporations are included in the decedent's gross estate, and if they exceed 75%
of the value of the outstanding stocks of such corporations, then the value of such
included stocks may be totalled for purposes of determining whether or not the 35%-
50% test has been satisfied. Only stock redeemed within a prescribed time period
(usually about 4 years) following the decedent's death will qualify. For a further
discussion, see notes 171-73 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the re-
quisites of § 303 and planning techniques for using it, see Barrett, How To Handle Dis-
tributions in Redemption of Stock To Pay Death Taxes-§ 303, 2 P-H TAx IDEAS
26,004.1 (1965).
16. See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
17. IN r. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(a) provides that if certain conditions are met,
a redemption will be "treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange
for the stock." This section will apply if any one of the following four conditions is
November 1969]
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Thus, the amount of the difference might be characterized either
as a dividend distribution or as a gift from the surviving share-
holders, giving rise to gift tax consequences. If the amount distrib-
uted by the corporation in payment of the stock is deemed less than
the stock's value, the shareholder will be required to pay estate
taxes based on a value in excess of that which he realized-a result
that could cause considerable hardship. Indeed, if the payment in
redemption is substantially less than the stock's value, the estate
tax liability incurred on account of the stock may actually exceed
the amount realized on its redemption. Thus, care should be taken
that the agreement fix the estate tax value of the stock, and that, in
any event, the established price be reasonable so that a failure to
comply with the above-mentioned requisites will not have disastrous
consequences.
B. The Purposes of the Corporation
Besides its advantages for the estate of the deceased shareholder,
a buy-out arrangement may also be desirable for the corporation and
the surviving shareholders. The buy-out can prevent a deadlock or
harassment by those who inherit stock from the decedent. Moreover,
a decedent's widow and the surviving shareholders will often have
conflicting goals for the corporation, and that conflict may compli-
cate the management of the company. The question whether corpo-
rate earnings should be distributed as dividends or reinvested in the
business, and the question of the amount of risk that the business
should undertake in entering new ventures are examples of potential
areas of conflict which could be eliminated through a buy-out
agreement.
Additional considerations arise if the corporation has made an
election under subchapter S.18 In that case, it is important that a
met: (1) the redemption is not essentially equivalent to the dividend [§ 302(b)(1)]; (2)
the distribution is substantially disproportionate [as defined in § 302(b)(2)(C)] with
respect to the shareholder and, immediately after the redemption, the shareholder
owns less than 50% of the total voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
[§ 302(b)(2)]; (3) the redemption is of all the stock of the corporation owned by the
shareholder [§ 302(b)(3)]; or (4) the redemption is of stock issued by a railroad pur-
suant to a reorganization plan under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1964)
[§ 302(b)(4)]. For a discussion of these provisions, see B. BrrrKm & J. EusncE, supra
note 13, at 279-94.
18. Subchapter S (INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-78) permits a corporation com-
plying with certain requisites to elect that its earnings be included in the income of its
shareholders. If such an election is made, the corporation pays no income tax other than
a capital gains tax imposed in certain circumstances (§ 1378). See D. KAHN, supra note 1,
ch. V. Buy-out arrangements for the redemption or purchase of the stock of a sub-
chapter S corporation raise peculiar problems and considerations which are not dealt
[Vol. 68:1
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shareholder be prevented from bequeathing his stock to a party
who would refuse to consent to the election 19 or to a trust,2 0 since
either of those contingencies would terminate the benefits of sub-
chapter S. A buy-out can protect the election by eliminating the
possibility of such a bequest.
Most of the purposes of the deceased shareholder's estate can be
satisfied by requiring the prospective purchaser to purchase the stock
if the estate elects to sell. But for the purposes of the continuing
shareholders and the corporation, and for the purpose of fixing
estate tax values, the decedent's estate must be obligated to sell if
the prospective purchaser elects to buy. Consequently, in most cir-
cumstances, a mandatory buy-out will be the most desirable arrange-
ment since it will satisfy the needs of both parties.
II. POTENTIAL PURCHASERS
Once it has been determined that a buy-out plan is desirable, the
potential purchaser of a shareholder's interest must be selected. As
indicated above, the purchaser is usually either the corporation (an
entity purchase) or the surviving shareholders (a cross-purchase), al-
though a combination of the two will sometimes be employed. But
there are other possibilities as well. The most significant of these
is a provision that part of the deceased shareholder's stock will be
purchased by a trust held under a qualified deferred compensation
plan established by the corporation for its employees.21 The Service
prohibits a qualified trust fund from acquiring the employer's stock
unless it is purchased for the "exclusive benefit of the employees or
their beneficiaries" and unless local law permits such investments -.2 2
Four conditions must be fulfilled to satisfy the exclusive-benefit
requirement: (1) the stock must be purchased at no more than its
fair market value; (2) the stock must provide a fair return commen-
surate with the prevailing rate; (3) sufficient liquidity must be main-
tained in the trust fund to permit distributions according to the
with in this Article. For an analysis of those problems, see Crumbley, Buy and Sell
Agreements for Subchapter S Corporations, 108 TRUsts & ESTATEs 17 (1969).
19. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1372(e)(1).
20. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371(a)(2), 1372(e)(3). The same result will follow
upon a bequest to a nonresident alien. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371(a)(3), 1372(e)(3).
21. There are many advantages to using the trust funds for that purpose. It pro-
vides the employees of the corporation with an equity interest in the business and
serves as a convenient source of liquid assets. Moreover, in some circumstances, there
are tax advantages to the employees who receive distributions of such stock on retire-
ment. INr. R v. CODE of 1954, § 402(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1A02(a)-l(b) (1956).
22. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 Cum. BuL. 94, 104.
November 1969]
Michigan Law Review
terms of the plan; and (4) the safeguards and diversity that a pru-
dent investor would adopt must be present.23 The common stock of
most closely held corporations will not satisfy the exclusive-benefit
test both because such stock usually has no available market and
because frequently few or no dividends will ever have been paid on
the stock, so that there will not be a fair return. Nevertheless, the
Service has held in a Technical Advice Memorandum that a trust
which maintains separate accounts for each employee satisfies the
exclusive-benefit test so long as the plan permits each employee at
his option to direct that part of his trust account be invested in his
employer's stock, and so long as the trustees are required to abide by
the decision of an employee as to how much of his account shall be
so invested.24 This Memorandum is buttressed by a subsequent pub-
lished ruling concerning profit-sharing trusts. 25 The requirement of
individual employee accounts makes it unlikely that such an ar-
rangement will be feasible for most pension plans26 although it may
be useful for profit-sharing plans. When funds of a qualified trust
are invested in the stock or securities of the employer, the trustee is
required to give notice to the Service of such investment and to dis-
close the reasons for the investment and the circumstances under
which it was made.27
In some situations it may be feasible to recapitalize the corpora-
don so that the deceased shareholder's estate receives preferred
stock in exchange for common. The preferred shares may then be
sold to the trust as long as they comply with the exclusive-benefit
test.28 However, if the recapitalization is effected after the share-
holder's death, the planner must give due regard to section 306 of
the Code.29
23. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 Cur. BULL. 94, 104.
24. The memorandum was from the National Office to the District Director, San
Francisco, dated Nov. 27, 1961. P-H PENSION & PRoFrr SHARING SERV. 11,983. For a
discussion of this issue, see D. ROTHMAN, ESTABLISHING & ADMINISTERING PENSION &c
PROFIT SHARING PLANS 9: TRUST FUNDS 160-63 (1967).
25. Rev. Rul. 65-178, pt. 5(r), 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 94, 125.
26. "Money purchase" pension plans might adopt separate investment accounts
for each employee's share, but most pension trusts could not readily adopt separate
accounts.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(ii) (1956).
28. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
29. In general, if "section 306" stock is sold, the entire proceeds of the sale may
constitute ordinary income to the recipient; if the stock is redeemed, the proceeds
constitute a corporate distribution subject to § 301 and thus wil frequently be
treated as ordinary income to the shareholder. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(a). See
B. BiTrana Sc J. EusTicE, supra note 18, ch. 8, for a thorough discussion. "Section
306" stock is defined in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(c):
(1) In general....
(A) . , . Stock (other than common stock issued with respect to common
[Vol. 68:1
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The use of trust funds for stock purchase purposes can be a
highly valuable device, but the path to this modem-day Valhalla is
no less perilous than the journey to the original, and the planner
should proceed with both caution and private rulings.
III. ENTITY PURCHASE PLANS
The entity purchase plan is the most popular form of buy-out
arrangement. Indeed, if a buy-out is to be arranged, there are a
number of good reasons for providing that the corporation will be
the purchaser of a decedent's shares. However, there are many con-
siderations relevant to the preparation of such an arrangement, and
all must be carefully appraised. The applicable state laws must be
examined in order to determine what measures have to be taken to
comply with those laws. A similar examination of the means by
which the corporation will obtain the funds needed for the buy-out
is required. A funded reserve may be established, life insurance may
be purchased, the corporation's notes may be used, or combinations
of these methods may be employed; each of those means will have
certain advantages and disadvantages. Since the principal competi-
tion to the entity purchase is the cross-purchase agreement,30 the
following discussion will occasionally contrast the two.
stock) which was distributed to the shareholder selling or otherwise disposing
of such stock if, by reason of section 305(a), any part of such distribution was
not includible in the gross income of the shareholder.
(B) . . . Stock which is not common stock and-(i) which was received, by the shareholder selling or otherwise disposing
of such stock, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization (within the meaning
of section 368(a)), or in a distribution or exchange to which section 355(or so much of section 356 as relates to section 355) applied, and(ii) with respect to the receipt of which gain or loss to the shareholder
was to any extent not recognized by reason of part III, but only to the extent
that either the effect of the transaction was substantially the same as the
receipt of a stock dividend, or the stock was received in exchange for section
306 stock.
For purposes of this section, a receipt of stock to which the foregoing provisions
of this subparagraph apply shall be treated as a distribution of stock.
(C) . . . Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), stock the basis
of which (in the hands of the shareholder selling or otherwise disposing of
such stock) is determined by reference to the basis (in the hands of such share-
holder or any other person) of section 306 stock.
(2) Exception where no earnings and profits.-For purposes of this section, the
term "section 306 stock" does not include any stock no part of the distribution of
which would have been a dividend at the time of the distribution if money had
been distributed in lieu of the stock.
Stock sold to the trust will not qualify under § 303 of the Code since it is not re-
deemed by the corporation. Consequently, the priority of § 303 over § 306 [see Treas.
Reg. § 1.303-2(d) (1955)] is of no assistance. Preferred stock issued after the decedent's
death will probably be tainted by § 306 of the Code. Therefore, all or part of the
amount received as consideration for the sale of such stock may be characterized as
ordinary income, irrespective of the xendor's basis in the stock. § 306(a)(1). See D. KAHN,
supra note 1, ch. I.
30. See pt. IV. A. infra.
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A. Cost
There are a variety of means available to fix the redemption
price of stock under a buy-sell agreement.31 A common method is the
selection by the parties of a specific dollar figure. If this is done,
however, the agreement should include a provision requiring peri-
odic review of that figure every one or two years, 32 and a further
provision that if a new figure is not set within one or two years
prior to a shareholder's death, the amount set in the agreement is to
be disregarded 33 and an alternative method of pricing is to apply.
There are many other means of valuation that might be employed,
such as a capitalization-of-earnings formula,34 a determination of
book value, an appraisal of the corporation's, tangible assets by a
selected appraiser or by members of a selected group of appraisers, 35
an arbitration provision, or a weighted combination of any of these
methods.36
If the shareholders are members of the same family unit, they
should resist the temptation to establish a low value for a deceased
shareholder's stock. A realistic valuation is important not only for
establishing the estate tax value of the stock,37 but also because a
low valuation may deprive the shareholder's estate of the use of
section 303 of the Code if the established value of the decedent's
stock is less than both thirty-five per cent of the decedent's gross
estate and fifty per cent of his taxable estate. 8
Once the price is established, the means by which it will be paid
31. Corneel, Valuation Techniques in Buy-Sell Agreements: Effect on Gift and
Estate Taxes, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 631 (1966).
32. The stock redemption agreement should include a page for inserting (1) the
established figure, (2) the signatures of the parties, and (3) the date of execution of
that page.
33. The agreement should state that the figure is effective only if established within
a given period prior to the shareholder's death.
34. The capitalization rate should be agreed upon by the parties and stated in the
agreement. That rate may be determined by considering the price-earnings ratio
of comparable companies whose stock is sold on the open market and therefore easily
valued. The annual earnings to be capitalized may be determined under a specific
formula when the use of such a procedure is desirable. For example, if the corpora-
tion's earnings are erratic, the parties may wish to average the last five years' earnings
and capitalize that amount; or in some circumstances, they may wish to average the
three years of the last five that had the highest (or the lowest) earnings.
35. An appraisal of assets may be especially appropriate if the corporation is a real
estate holding company.
36. There is considerable literature on the subject of valuation, and the reader may
locate writings discussing the appropriate methods of valuing the very kind of business
in which his corporation is engaged.
37. See text accompany notes 8-12 supra.
38. See note 15 supra.
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becomes an important consideration. One of the attractive features
of the entity purchase is that the use of corporate funds to redeem
a deceased shareholder's stock usually imposes a smaller net cost
on the corporation and the surviving shareholders than does a cross-
purchase agreement.
Since the amount paid to redeem a shareholder's stock is not
deductible, 30 an accurate determination of the actual cost of pur-
chasing the decedent's stock should reflect the amount that the cor-
poration must earn before taxes in order to make the payment. If,
for example, the X Corporation is in a forty-eight per cent income
tax bracket, and it agrees to redeem a shareholder's stock for
52,000 dollars, X must earn 100,000 dollars to have sufficient funds
available after taxes for the redemption. Of course, it might not be
necessary for the corporation to draw on its earnings in order to
redeem a shareholder's stock; instead it might be able to contract its
capital investment and distribute previously contributed capital. But
in the usual buy-out arrangement, a contraction of the corporation's
business investment will not be desirable and may not even be feasi-
ble. Moreover, the shareholder's stock will often be valued at an
amount much greater than his capital contributions, and the earn-
ings of the corporation would probably be the best available source
for the funds needed to acquire the stock.
In a cross-purchase plan, the surviving shareholders will usually
obtain from the corporation the funds needed to purchase the
decedent's stock.40 If the funds must be withdrawn as dividends,
the additional cost to the corporation and the shareholders can be
severe. A comparison between the above example of the cost of an
entity purchase and the following illustration of a cross-purchase
arrangement reveals the disparity.
III-A-1. The X Corporation is in a 48% tax bracket and has three
equal shareholders, A, B, and C. These three have agreed that the X
stock of the first to die will be purchased by the two survivors for
$52,000. A, B, and C are each in the 60% tax bracket.41 When A dies,
39. Distributions in redemption are not business expenses under § 162 of the Code,
and will likely constitute a capital expenditure, which is nondeductible under § 263
of the Code.
40. If the cross-purchase agreement is funded by life insurance, the premiums for
that insurance will usually be paid from funds withdrawn from the corporation, so the
comparison of relative costs of a direct purchase of the stock will be equally applicable
to the payment of insurance premiums. In some circumstances, the net cost of pur-
chasing life insurance for shareholders who are also employees of the corporation may
be reduced by utilizing a split-dollar insurance plan. Such a plan, however, should
probably not be used to fund a buy-out agreement. See notes 238-45 infra and ac-
companying text. See also Note, Estate Planning for the Disposition of Control of a
Family Corporation, 52 MINN. L. Rrv. 1019, 1030 nA6 (1968).
41. The withdrawal from the corporation of a large sum which will be included in
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B and C wish to withdraw sufficient funds from X to pay $52,000 to
A's estate. Since B and C will retain only 40% of dividends paid to
them after taxes, they must withdraw $130,000 to obtain the $52,000
needed. The corporation will have to earn $250,000 in order to have
$130,000 available after taxes to distribute to B and C. Thus, under a
cross-purchase plan, the net cost of obtaining $52,000 from the cor-
poration is $250,000 as compared with $100,000 under the entity
purchase plan.
When the amounts distributed to the surviving shareholders can be
made in a deductible forml4 2 -such as salary, interest, or rent-the
difference in net cost is less dramatic, but the entity purchase is still
the cheaper method, unless the shareholders are in an income tax
bracket lower than that of the corporation.4
III-A-2. Assume the same facts as in example III-A-1 except that B
and C are able to withdraw funds from X as deductible expenses,
such as salary. In order to obtain the needed $52,000 after taxes, B
and C must withdraw $130,000 from X; but since the amounts paid
to B and C are deductible, X need earn only $130,000 to provide B
and G with after-tax dollars of that amount. Thus, even though the
payments to the shareholders are deductible, the net cost of the cross-
purchase plan ($130,000) will be $30,000 greater than the cost of the
entity plan.
It should not be assumed, however, that the entity purchase will be
superior to a cross-purchase plan in every case. Both plans have their
distinctive merits and disadvantages, and both should be considered
carefully in the context of the specific circumstances and goals that
exist in each individual situation.
One disadvantage of the entity purchase is that the corporation
derives no tax benefit from the acquisition of the decedent's stock
regardless of whether it cancels the redeemed shares or carries them
as treasury stock. The corporation cannot recognize a gain or loss
on the sale of its own stock, including treasury stock,4 4 and conse-
quently its basis in the redeemed shares is meaningless. In contrast,
when a surviving shareholder acquires stock under a cross-purchase
the shareholder's gross income would probably be taxed in a higher bracket than
60%; but for convenience, the effective tax rate on amounts withdrawn is here treated
as remaining stable at 60%. If the higher tax rates were used in making the com-
putations, the expense of withdrawing funds from the corporation would be increased,
and therefore the comparison of the costs of the two buy-out methods would be even
more dramatic.
42. This is sometimes possible when the corporate funds are withdrawn annually
for the purpose of paying life insurance premiums, if the annual distribution does not
exceed a reasonable salary, and if the funds are paid as such.
4S. If the shareholders are in a lower tax bracket than the corporation and funds
can be withdrawn from the corporation in a deductible form, the cross-purchase plan
will be a less expensive arrangement. That situation, however, is atypical.
44. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1032.
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agreement, his basis in the acquired stock is meaningful if he dis-
poses of the stock prior to his death.
One risk that attends an entity purchase is the possibility that the
corporation's purchase of one shareholder's stock may be treated as a
constructive dividend to the other shareholders, whose percentage of
equity in the corporation is increased by virtue of the redemption.
Fortunately, there are buoys in these troubled waters,45 and if the
planner navigates carefully, he can steer a safe course which avoids
adverse tax consequences to the surviving shareholders. In general,
the primary obligation to purchase the decedent's stock must rest
exclusively on the corporation; the other shareholders must have no
obligation to purchase anything, but they may accept a secondary
liability arising if the corporation defaults.46
A more important danger of the entity purchase is the possibility
that the redemption of stock will be deemed essentially equivalent
to a dividend and taxed accordingly. The applicable principles in
this area are highly technical and require great caution, but dividend
treatment can be avoided.47 The difficulty may be seen best by an
example:
III-A-3. A owns fifty shares of the outstanding stock of the X Cor-
poration, and A's brother, B, owns the remaining fifty shares. A
wishes to make a testamentary bequest to B, and to leave his resid-
uary estate to his wife, W. If, upon A's death, the X Corporation
redeems A's fifty shares of stock from his estate, the redemption will
not be deemed substantially disproportionate or a termination of
interest, because A's estate will have attributed to it the fifty shares
of stock owned by B who is a beneficiary of the estate.48
Proper tax planning prior to A's death could prevent the difficulties
on redemption. One possible plan is to eliminate mention of B
45. Rev. Rul. 59-286, 1959-2 Cum. BuL.. 103; Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 Cum,. BuLL.
920.
46. See note 179 infra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 18-15 supra and accompanying text.
48. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 318(a)(3)(A). It is theoretically possible to avoid attribu-
tion in this example by first distributing B's bequest to him and then effecting the
redemption of the stock, since, in that event, B will not be a beneficiary of the estate
at the time of redemption as long as certain conditions are satisfied. Treas. Reg. § 1.318-
3(a) (1955). One of the conditions is that there must be no more than a remote pos-
sibility that the estate will seek contribution from the beneficiary for payment of
claims against it or for expenses of administration. Since this is a dangerous planning
device, it is not recommended. See, e.g., Estate of Webber v. United States, 263 F. Supp.
703 (E.D. Ky. 1967), affd., 404 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1968), for an indication of the serious-
ness of that danger. In Webber, the beneficiary of several specific bequests had received
distribution of all of his bequests prior to a stock redemption but was nevertheless
deemed a beneficiary of the estate at the date of redemption because there was a
possibility that he would have to contribute to the estate or to other beneficiaries a
pro rata portion of the estate's tax liabilities. It must be remembered, too, that a
residuary legatee of an estate does not cease to be a beneficiary until the estate is dosed.
Rev. Rul. 60-18, 1960-1 Com. BuLL. 145.
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from A's will, and to utilize an inter vivos revocable trust as a
vehicle for transferring B's interest. Another is to place A's stock in
X in a revocable trust4 9 which is insulated from attribution of B's
stock as long as neither B nor any person who has constructive
ownership of B's stock is a beneficiary of the trust. 0
If the stock is included in the deceased shareholder's gross
estate, the dividend question can be avoided to the extent that it is
covered by section 303,51 or by section 302(b),52 or even by sections
331(a)(2) and 346.1; Section 303, for example, applies even when the
decedent's stock is held in a revocable trust at the time of his death,
so long as the stock is included in the decedent's gross estate. 54 When
the dividend problem is solved, there will usually be no tax conse-
quences on the redemption of stock included in the decedent's estate.
Under section 1014 of the Code, the basis of such stock is equal to
its fair market value at decedent's death,5 so there is likely to be
little or no gain realized on the redemption of the stock. If the
stock included in the decedent's estate is section 306 stock,5 6 it loses
that taint on the decedent's death.5v Thus, section 306 should not
pose difficulties unless there is a corporate reorganization or stock
dividend paid after the decedent's death and before the redemption,
and unless the newly issued stock constitutes section 306 stock. Even
then, a redemption of the newly issued section 306 stock will not
have adverse tax consequences if the redemption qualifies under
section 303.58
49. This second method should not be employed if the X corporation has made
an election under subchapter S since the transfer to the revocable trust may terminate
the election. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1371-1(d)(1), -1(e) (1959), 1.1372-4(b)(3) (1959).
50. See INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 318(a)(3)(B); note 14 supra.
51. See note 15 supra and accdmpanying text.
52. See note 17 supra.
53. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 331(a)(2) provides that amounts received in partial
liquidation of a corporation, as defined in § 346 of the Code, shall be treated as pay-
ments in exchange for stock.
54. Property held in a revocable trust will be included in the donor's gross estate.
INr. Ray. CODE of 1954, § 2038.
55. This is true unless the estate elects the alternate valuation date (INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 2032), in which case the date on which the stock is valued for estate tax
purposes controls. INT. REv CODE of 1954, § 1014(a). As used in § 1014, the phrase "fair
market value" refers to the value determined under the estate tax laws [Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1014-1(a) (1957)]; in most cases, the estate tax value will equal the purchase price
of the stock.
56. See note 29 supra. "Section 306" stock is discussed in B. BrTrM & J. EUSTICa,
supra note 13, ch. 8.
57. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(c).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.303-2(d) (1955) provides that § 303 takes precedence over § 306.
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B. Funding
Upon the death of a shareholder who is a party to an entity
purchase agreement, the corporation must have sufficient assets to
redeem the shareholder's stock. There are several ways for the cor-
poration to raise the necessary funds.59
1. Reserve Funding
The corporation may seek to raise the necessary funds by invest-
ing a portion of each year's corporate earnings in liquid assets that
will constitute a funded reserve. One difficulty with a self-funding
plan is that a shareholder might die soon after the plan is executed,
before the corporation has had time to accumulate a sufficient sur-
plus in its reserve fund to redeem his stock.
But even if the shareholders obligingly live long after the plan
is established, the accumulation of a sizeable surplus may have ad-
verse tax consequences, for the corporation may be subjected to the
imposition of an accumulated earnings tax.6° That tax, which is
imposed in addition to the normal corporate tax and surtax,61 applies
to corporations "formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding
the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders
of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and profits to accu-
mulate instead of being divided or distributed. 6 2 If the earnings
and profits of the corporation are accumulated beyond the reason-
able needs of the business,63 the corporation is presumed to be
availed of for the proscribed purpose unless it proves the contrary. 64
In determining the amount of the accumulated earnings tax, the
59. For example, a third party may be used as an interim financing intermediary
for the corporation in an arrangement similar to the "ABC" transactions employed in
the oil and gas field. See Sexton, Providing Security for the Outgoing Stockholder and
Avoiding Tax Disadvantages to Selling and Remaining Stockholders, N.Y.U. 24TH INST.
ON FED. TAx. 555, 584-85 (1966). In some drcumstances, the corporation may be able to
borrow the needed funds directly from a third party and to repay the loan from sub-
sequent earnings. Cf. Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967).
60. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-37. The accumulated earnings tax is a tax of
27 % or 3812% which is imposed on accumulated taxable income. "Accumulated
taxable income" refers to the corporation's taxable income modified in accordance
with § 535 of the Code. One important modification is a deduction for dividends paid,
although many other adjustments are also applicable. In addition, the temporary
surtax imposed by § 102 of Public Law 90-364 (June 28, 1968) (INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 51) serves to increase the amount of the accumulated earnings surtax.
61. These taxes are imposed under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 11.
62. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532(a).
63. The phrase "reasonable needs of the business" includes the reasonably antici-
pated needs of the business. INT. REv. CODa of 1954, § 537.
64. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 533.
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accumulated taxable income65 of a corporation is reduced by the
sum of dividends paid plus an accumulated earnings credit.6 Gen-
erally, the accumulated earnings credit is equal to that part of the
earnings and profits for the taxable year that are retained for the
reasonable needs of the business.67 In no event will the accumulated
earnings credit be less than the amount by which 100,000 dollars
exceeds the corporation's accumulated earnings and profits deter-
mined as of the end of the preceding taxable year.0 8
In the great majority of cases litigated under the accumulated
earnings tax provisions, the parties have treated the question
whether the corporation accumulated earnings and profits beyond
the reasonable needs of the business as dispositive. 69 That question,
however, should be only evidentiary of the crucial issue-whether
the corporation's accumulation was for the purpose of avoiding a
shareholder's income tax.
Recently, in United States v. Donruss,7° the Supreme Court settled
the question whether the accumulated earnings tax may be applied
whenever the proscribed purpose is present or only when that pur-
pose is the dominant motive for the accumulation. The Court held
that if any purpose of the corporation for accumulating its earnings
was the proscribed one, the tax is applicable even though the pro-
scribed purpose was not dominant. There will probably be few
instances when a taxpayer can successfully negate the inference that
tax avoidance was at least one of the purposes for the accumulation
of earnings by a closely held corporation. Thus, the principal
65. See note 60 supra.
66. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 535(a).
67. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 535(c). The credit is reduced by the excess of the
corporation's net long-term capital gains over net short-term capital losses for the tax-
able year minus the corporation's income taxes attributable to such excess. The reason
for that reduction is that in determining accumulated taxable income, the taxable
income is reduced by the same amount [§ 535(b)(6)], which is thereby made available
for the reasonable needs of the business; if no reduction were made in the credit, the
capital gains would, in effect, net a double deduction.
68. INT. R V CODE of 1954, § 535(c)(2). For a more thorough analysis of the ac-
cumulated earnings tax, see B. BsrrIrR & J. EusTicE, supra note 13, at 209-38; Faber,
Practitioner's Guide to Defending a 531 Case: Theory and Practice, 27 J. TAXATION 274
(1967).
69. Because of the presumption in § 533(a) that accumulations beyond the rea-
sonable needs of the business demonstrate that the corporation had the proscribed
purpose, the parties have usually litigated only the business purpose question, and
there have been few attempts to rebut the presumption. For a thorough discussion
of the application of the "reasonable needs of the business" test to corporate accumula-
tions related to a stock redemption, see Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumu-
lated Earnings Tax, 74 HARv. L. REv. 866 (1961).
70. 393 U.S. 297 (1969). See also Commissioner v. Shaw-Walker Co., 393 U.S. 478,
vacating 390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir.), remanded to T.C., 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5154 (6th
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refuge is the business needs test,71 since under the available credit,
the accumulated earnings surtax will not be imposed on accumula-
tions that do not exceed the reasonable needs of the business, irre-
spective of the motive for those accumulations.7 2 Although the stat-
ute restricts the credit to accumulations "retained for the reasonable
needs of the business," 73 it appears that the credit will be granted
for accumulations that are not in excess of the reasonable needs of
the business even if the actual purpose of the accumulations was the
proscribed one. The Commissioner has not yet contended otherwise.
If a buy-out is funded by means of a reserve, then an annual
addition to that reserve will probably cause the imposition of the
accumulated earnings tax to the extent that the earnings and profits
accumulated in that year exceed those reasonably needed for the
business.7 4 There are two separate issues here: (1) whether accumu-
lations in anticipation of a stock redemption are within the reason-
able needs of the business, and (2) if not, whether the accumulations
are nonetheless exempt f-om the surtax because not made for the
proscribed purpose."
The business needs test provided by the credit established in
section 535 refers to the business needs of only the corporation.6
In Pelton Steel Casting Company,77 the accumulated earnings tax
was imposed when income of the corporation was accumulated in
order to redeem the stock of two shareholders who owned eighty
per cent of the corporation's outstanding stock. A number of courts,
however, have held that accumulations for the purpose of redeeming
a shareholder's stock may qualify as a reasonable need of the busi-
ness.78 In Emeloid Company v. Commissioner,79 the court held that
Cir. 1969). One of the bases for the remand to the Tax Court was for a determination,
in accordance with Donruss, of whether or not the corporation had the proscribed
purpose.
71. See Altman & Muchin, Supreme Court's Donruss Decision Calls for a Shift in
Tactics in 531 Area, 30 J. TAxATION 202 (1969).
72. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 535(c)(1) grants a credit for amounts accumulated for
the reasonable needs of the business. See Magic Mart, Inc., 51 T.C. 775 (1969), result
acq., 1969 Ir. REv. BuLL.. No. 33, at 7.
73. Irr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 535(c)(1).
74. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra. See also Herwitz, supra note 69.
75. See Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest in a Closely
Held Business (pt. I1), 46 IowA L. REv. 516, 541-46 (1961).
76. Youngs Rubber Corp., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 62,300 (1962), affd. per curiam,
331 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964).
77. 28 T.C. 153 (1957), affd., 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958
(1958).
78. Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir.
1960), revg. 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 59,059 (1959); Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F.
November 1969]
Michigan Law Review
the purchase of single premium life insurance on the life of each of
the corporation's two fifty per cent shareholders, for the purpose of
funding a mandatory buy-out agreement, was a business purpose, be-
cause it provided for the continuity of harmonious management
after the death of one shareholder and established a reimbursement
to the corporation for the loss of a key man.80 While the Emeloid
case did not involve the accumulated earnings tax,8' courts and
commentators alike have treated Emeloid as establishing that a stock
redemption agreement may serve the needs of the corporate busi-
ness for purposes of that tax. 82
Thus, notwithstanding the broad language employed in Pelton
Steel, it is reasonably certain that a stock redemption does serve
business needs in certain circumstances. The test, apparently, is
whether the redemption is for the purpose of continuing the har-
monious management of the business by eliminating the stock of
potentially dissident shareholders, or whether the redemption is
merely for the benefit of a shareholder. If the shareholders have
adverse interests as to the manner in which the corporate business
should be conducted, the business purpose of the redemption is
evident. Similarly, the redemption of stock of a minority shareholder
is more likely to withstand attack than is the redemption of the stock
of a majority shareholder, but there are circumstances in which a
redemption of a majority shareholder's stock serves the needs of the
corporation.83 The subjectivity of the tests for determining whether
or not a stock redemption is a reasonable need of the business creates
Supp. 779 (E.D. Ark. 1952); Ted Bates & Co., 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 65,251 (1965);
Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939), nonacq., 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 47. Mountain State in-
volved accumulations after the redemption for the purpose of paying notes given in
exchange for redeemed stock.
79. 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951).
80. Accumulations for the purpose of providing self-insurance against the loss of
key personnel, including shareholder employees, were sustained in Bradford-Robinson
Printing Co. v. United States, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1278 (D. Colo. 1957).
81. Emeloid involved a claim for an excess profits tax credit for borrowed investment
capital. The question was whether or not a loan made for the purpose of paying an
insurance premium was made for a business purpose so that it qualified as borrowed
investment capital.
82. Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737, 745 (4th
Cir. 1960), revg. 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 59,059 (1959); Ted Bates & Co., 34 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 65,251, at 65-1495 n.9 (1965); Faber Cement Block Co., 50 T.C. 317, 335
(1968), acq., 1969 IrT. REv. BULL. No. 2, at 6; Herwitz, supra note 69; Polasky, supra
note 75, at 541. Additional cases, which did not involve the accumulated earnings tax,
suggest that a stock purchase may serve the corporation's business needs. Sanders v.
Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958); Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.
1957).
83. See Herwitz, supra note 69, at 909-19.
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uncertainties, and the risk that the surtax will be imposed should
be recognized. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, an accumulation
of corporate earnings will be advantageous even if the surtax is
imposed.8 4
Even if an accumulation in anticipation of a stock redemption
does not satisfy the business needs test, the surtax may be deemed
inapplicable on the ground that the accumulation was not made
for the purpose of avoiding the income tax of a shareholder.8 5 If a
projected redemption is likely to qualify under section 303 of the
Code for exclusion from dividend treatment, it is arguables that
accumulations for the purpose of effecting that redemption are not
for the proscribed purpose, but rather are pursuant to a congres-
sionally approved policy to permit and even to encourage the use
of corporate assets to satisfy a deceased shareholder's tax liabilities
and other death costs. It would be anomalous to encourage a cor-
poration to redeem the stock of a deceased shareholder, and at the
same time to deter it from accumulating the funds needed for the
redemption. Since Congress has clearly encouraged redemptions to
the extent of tax liabilities and death costs, funds accumulated for
that purpose should be immune from the additional tax imposed
by section 531. Donruss8 7 should not be read to require application
of that tax to funds held for a congressionally approved purpose.
Three cases,a8 however, have held that an accumulation in anticipa-
tion of a section 303 redemption is not a reasonable need of the
business. But the opinions in those cases do not attempt to reconcile
their holdings with the rationale of section 303, nor do they discuss
whether or not the corporation was availed of for the proscribed
purpose. Indeed, there is language in another case, Mountain State
Steel Foundries, Incorporated v. Commissioner,s9 suggesting that the
84. If the shareholders are in high income tax brackets and funds can be with-
drawn from the corporation only as dividends, the surtax on accumulations plus the
ultimate cost of withdrawing funds at capital gains rates on liquidation--or at no tax
cost if they are withdrawn after a shareholder's death-may be substantially less than
the cost of withdrawing the funds as dividends.
85. As previously noted, it is the existence or absence of the proscribed purpose
that is crucial to determining whether the accumulated earnings surtax is applicable.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 532(a); see text accompanying notes 61-73 supra.
86. This argument was suggested to the author by Mr. Lawrence Robinson in a
research paper prepared by the latter.
87. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
88. Dickman Lumber Co. v. United States, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 27 (D. Wash.
1964), affd., 355 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1966); The Kirlin Co., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
64,260 (1964), affd. per curiam, 361 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1966); Youngs Rubber Corp.,
31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 62,300 (1962), affd. per curiam, 331 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1964).
89. 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).
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surtax should not be imposed when section 303 is applicable. The
court said:
Among other things, [Congress] specifically provided that a partial
redemption of the shares held by an estate would be treated as a
sale, not as a distribution of earnings, if the amount of the distribu-
tion did not exceed the estate's liabilities for estate and inheritance
taxes, interest and funeral and administrative expenses. When Con-
gress specifically provided favorable tax treatment for such trans-
actions and sought to encourage them to facilitate the administration
of estates, it hardly could have intended to penalize the corporation
for doing the favored act.90
Thus, while there is little precedent to comfort the taxpayer at this
date, the issue has not yet been adequately discussed by the courts,
and if attention were focused on the purpose of the accumulation
rather than on the business needs, it is possible that the present
trend would be reversed.
Nevertheless, a judicially created exception to section 531 may
be necessary for the success of such a contention, and an anticipated
exception-no matter how inherently sound-to an established rule
should not form the basis of any plan. Until there is more support
for the argument advanced herein, the planner should rely only
upon the credit granted to accumulations for the reasonable needs
of the business. Of course, if litigation has already arisen as to the
application of the surtax, the above argument might be useful.
But even if it is established that accumulations fulfill a business
need or that an exception to section 531 is warranted, such accumu-
lations may frustrate the congressional policy of eliminating the use
of a corporation as an "incorporated pocketbook." If a corporation
accumulates assets to redeem its stock, the net worth of the
corporation will increase, so that the value of its stock-and conse-
quently the cost of redemption-will rise proportionately. The re-
sulting increase in the amount of the corporation's liability to re-
deem its stock will justify additional accumulations which in turn
will further increase the redemption price and thereby justify even
greater accumulations. This potential spiralling effect weighs against
permitting any accumulations for the purpose of redemption. In the
usual case, however, the accumulations do not rise in such a manner,
because the corporation generally establishes a reserve only for a
portion of the purchase price. Thus, a reasonable solution to this
dilemma is to permit accumulations for redemption purposes when
that fulfills corporate objectives, but to preclude accumulations for
90. 284 F.2d at 745.
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that part of the redemption value of the stock which is attributable
to the corporation's funded reserve. This issue has not yet been
resolved and, in any event, does not become pertinent until the
prior question as to taxability of accumulations has been resolved.
2. Life Insurance Funding
A common means of funding an entity buy-out plan is the pur-
chase by the corporation of life insurance policies on the lives of its
shareholders. 91 The proceeds of the policies may be made payable
to the corporation upon the death of a shareholder, and the corpora-
tion may then use the proceeds to redeem the decedent's shares of
stock. As a preferable method, however, the policies may be held by
a trustee who will collect the proceeds on the death of the insured,
purchase the decedent's shares of stock, surrender the purchased
shares to the corporation, and distribute the insurance proceeds to
the decedent's estate or beneficiary. Indeed, in some circumstances,
the shareholders' stock may be held in escrow by the trustee so
that there is no risk of a default by the estate of a deceased share-
holder. In the interest of caution, however, the stock of a subchapter
S corporation should not be placed in escrow, lest that terminate the
subchapter S election. A third possibility is to make the insurance
proceeds payable directly to a person or fiduciary appointed by the
insured, and to make that payment subject to the conditions that
the insured's stock be surrendered to the corporation and that the
insurance proceeds be credited against the purchase price of the
surrendered stock. The advantage of this latter method, which is
rarely employed, is that it permits the recipients of the insurance
proceeds to elect among the settlement options provided by the
policy.
Life insurance funding is available only when the shareholders
are insurable. Moreover, if one or more shareholders are given a
high risk rating, the insurance costs may be prohibitive. This diffi-
culty can be overcome if the uninsurable or high-risk shareholder
already owns life insurance policies which he is willing to sell to
the corporation for their cash surrender value,0 2 but that situation
is atypical.
91. See Note, The Use of Life Insurance to Fund Agreements Providing for Dis-
position of a Business Interest at Death, 71 HARV. L. REv. 687 (1958).
92. If the shareholder sells the policy to the corporation for an amount greater
than his net premium cost (total aggregate premiums paid less dividends), the difference
will constitute income to the shareholder, and may well be characterized as ordinary
income. Roff v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1962), affg. 36 T.C. 818 (1961);
Edwin A. Gallan, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,167 (1963); Boiling Jones, Jr., 39 T.C. 404
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If life insurance funding is used for a buy-out, there are a number
of considerations which must be kept in mind. Various tax conse-
quences-involving income tax, estate tax, and the accumulated
earnings tax-are associated with paying premiums, holding insur-
ance policies, and collecting proceeds. The settlement options avail-
able to the beneficiary of a deceased shareholder should also be
considered.
a. Tax consequences. In the first place, the corporation is not
allowed an income tax deduction for the payment of insurance
premiums. Section 264(a)(1) disallows any income tax deduction for
payment of premiums on a life insurance policy covering the life of
a person financially interested in the trade or business conducted by
the corporation, when the corporation is directly or indirectly a
beneficiary of the policy. Since the proceeds of the insurance ac-
quired under a buy-out plan are used in place of other corporate
funds as consideration for the corporation's redemption of its stock,
the corporation is at least an indirect beneficiary; consequently, no
income tax deduction is allowed.
Nevertheless, there will not be adverse income tax consequences
to the insured when the corporation pays the premiums. Although
there was once some question on this matter, it is now settled that
a corporation's payment of premiums on policies insuring the life
of a shareholder will not be included in the gross income of the
shareholder when the corporation has substantial ownership rights
in the policy, if either (1) the corporation is the beneficiary of the
policy, or (2) a trustee or other party is the beneficiary and the dis-
tribution of the proceeds of the policy is conditioned upon the sur-
render of the insured's stock. 93
Moreover, the income tax impact of the payment of premiums
on a corporation's earnings and profits is not likely to be great.
"Earnings and profits" is a term of art employed exclusively in cor-
porate taxation. The earnings and profits of a corporation are the
measuring rod for determining whether or not corporate distribu-
tions to shareholders constitute dividends and are therefore taxed
as ordinary income.91 Earnings and profits may also be a significant
(1962). The sale to the corporation will not cause the proceeds of the insurance to be
included in the corporation's gross income when the policy matures. INT. RIV. CODE
of 1954, §§ 101(a)(1), (2)(B).
93. Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958); Prunier v. Commissioner, 248
F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957); Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Rev. Rul.
59-184, 1959-1 Cum. Buu.. 65.
94. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a).
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factor in determining the tax consequences of some liquidations, 5
and, as indicated above, 9 may be relevant in determining the appli-
cability of the accumulated earnings tax. Basically, the earnings
and profits refer to the assets of the corporation which are available
for distribution to shareholders without impairing capital. The
term is not specifically defined anywhere in the Code, although sec-
tion 312 and the regulations thereunder give numerous examples
concerning the manner in which the size of a corporation's earnings
and profits is determined.97
The earnings and profits concept is analogous to that of earned
surplus, and the two quantities are often virtually identical. It
could be a disastrous mistake, however, to assume that they are nec-
essarily identical for any given corporation, for there are adjust-
ments made to one that are not made to the other. The distribution
of stock dividends, for example, will reduce earned surplus but,
except in the unusual case of a taxable stock dividend, 8 will have no
effect on the corporation's earnings and profits. Similarly, the capi-
talization of earned surplus by other means will not reduce earnings
and profits.
If a corporation owns a life insurance policy, the firm's earnings
and profits will be reduced by the excess of the amount of premiums
paid over the increase in the policy's cash surrender value.99 It is un-
settled, however, whether the entire increase in the policy's value is
taken into account or only the increase caused by the payment of
such premiums. The rationale for this rule is that the portion of a
premium payment which increases the policy's cash surrender value
95. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 333(e), (f).
96. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
97. For a discussion of the determination of earnings and profits, see D. KAHN, supra
note 1, ch. I; Zarky & Biblin, The Role of Earnings and Profits in the Tax Law, U. So.
CAL. 1966 TA x INST. 145.
98. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 305 provides that stock dividends are usually not tax-
able and describes the only two situations in which they are taxed. Recently promul-
gated regulations, however, have sought to expand the taxation of stock dividends.
Section 421 of the proposed Tax Reform Act of 1969 (H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.),
if adopted, would expand the taxation of stock dividends even further. At this writ-
ing, the Bill has passed the House and is pending in the Senate.
99. One commentator has written that he knows of a private ruling that so held.
Katcher, What Is Meant by Earnings and Profits?, 18 N.Y.U. INSTrruTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION 235, 236 n.10 (1960). Zarky : Biblin, The Role of Earnings and Profits in the
Tax Law, 18 U.S.C. TAX INsrrTrTE 145, 152 (1966), state that earnings and profits are
reduced by the total amount of the premiums paid and are increased by the total
annual increment in cash surrender value; they rely on a stipulation between the
Service and a taxpayer permitting the reduction [Shellabarger Grain Prods., 2 T.C. 75,
81 (1943)] and on a ruling (Rev. Rul. 55-257, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 428) that increments in
cash surrender value may be added to accumulated earnings and profits for the purpose
of computing equity invested capital under the excess profits tax provisions.
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has not been expended by the corporation but has merely been ex-
changed for an asset of equal value.
This rule makes the accumulated earnings tax considerations of
life insurance funding important. The portion of the premium that
is reflected in the policy's cash value is treated as an investment;
therefore, if the corporation has a substantial equity in the policy,
the presence of that equity and the failure to reduce earnings and
profits by the full amount of the premium payments may cause the
corporation's earnings and profits to accumulate beyond the reason-
able needs of the business. 100 The corporation's defenses to an at-
tempted imposition of the surtax for accumulations in anticipation
of a stock redemption' 01 are equally applicable when life insurance
is employed as the means of funding. Thus, the corporation must
demonstrate that the stock redemption plan serves the needs of the
business, that the insurance protects the corporation from the loss
of a key man, or, possibly, that because of the interplay of sections
303 and 531, the accumulations reflected in the insurance policies
are not for the proscribed purpose.
If the corporation uses term life insurance' 0 2 to fund the redemp-
tion plan, it avoids accumulated earnings problems insofar as
the insurance policy is concerned. Since term insurance policies
have no cash surrender value, the full amount of the premiums
paid reduces the corporation's earnings and profits, and consequently
the corporation's purchase of term insurance will not contribute to
its accumulations. In most circumstances, however, term insurance
will not solve the corporation's surtax problems. Term insurance
is useful to provide a level amount of insurance for a short period
of time or a declining amount of insurance for a longer period; but
the cost of maintaining a level amount of term insurance for a sub-
stantial period of time will normally be prohibitive.0 3 If the cor-
poration purchases declining term insurance, 0 4 the dollar amount
100. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 533(a) creates a presumption that a corporation pos-
sessed the proscribed purpose when its earnings and profits are accumulated beyond
reasonable business needs.
101. See notes 60-82 supra and accompanying text.
102. "Term life insurance" is pure risk insurance-the owner purchases insurance
against the risk that the insured will die during the period of coverage, and no part of
the premiums constitutes an equity of investment. As the insured ages, the risk of his
death in any period of coverage becomes greater and the insurance premium for a
fixed amount of coverage increases correspondingly.
103. For a defense of using pure term insurance for a substantial period of coverage,
see J. PAwLIcK, How To AVOID BEING OVERCHARGED BY YOUR LIFE INSURANCE SALESMAN
(1968).
104. "Declining term insurance" is term insurance of such a nature that the annual
premium payments remain level or nearly so and that the amount of proceeds payable
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of insurance proceeds payable on the insured's death will be reduced
each year, but the corporation's dollar obligation under its stock
redemption agreement will not usually decline. Indeed, the purchase
price of the stock will often increase if the corporation's business
is successful. Therefore, it is customary to complement declining
term insurance funding with an investment program which estab-
lishes a funded reserve, so that the value and amount of the invest-
ments will increase as the insurance declines. This again raises the
specter of the accumulated earnings surtax, and, insofar as that is
concerned, term insurance does not offer any advantages over ordi-
nary life insurance. Nevertheless, for reasons discussed hereafter, 15
term insurance is often the best available funding method.
Although receipt of the proceeds of a life insurance policy will
increase the corporation's earnings and profits,10 6 there will be no
surtax problems if the proceeds are paid out in redemption of the
decedent's stock in the same taxable year. But even when the pro-
ceeds cannot be distributed that promptly, there will still be no
surtax problems as long as the corporation has a contractual obliga-
tion to distribute the proceeds in redemption of the decendent's
stock within a reasonably short period of time.10  There may, how-
ever, be an adverse consequence, since the corporation, after re-
ceiving the insurance proceeds and redeeming the stock, could
realize a net increase in earnings and profits. But in most instances
that will not be a serious risk and will involve small amounts. The
Service has ruled' that when a corporation receives proceeds from
a life insurance policy, its earnings and profits are increased by the
excess of those proceeds over the aggregate amount of premiums
previously paid. Presumably, the ruling is grounded on the premise
that, to the extent of premiums paid, the insurance proceeds are a
return of the corporation's capital, and normally a return of capital
does not affect earnings and profits. However, the soundness of this
ruling is doubtful. At the time of payment, a portion of the pre-
miums reduced earnings and profits,10 9 and consequently the re-
on the insured's death is reduced annually or at other stated periods. Thus, while the
insurance premium "rate" increases, the coverage is reduced so that the amount of
premium payable for the policy remains constant.
105. See text accompanying notes 157-66 infra.
106. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
107. Cf. Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 787 (4th
Cir. 1960).
108. Rev. Rul. 54-230, 1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 114. See also Cummings v. Commissioner,
73 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1934).
109. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
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capture of that portion of the premium payments should be restored
to the corporation's earnings and profits. Moreover, the difference
between an annual premium payment and the increment in cash
surrender value caused by that payment is largely attributable to
the pure insurance risk that the insured might die within that policy
year. 0 The consideration for that portion of the premium-one
year's risk coverage-is consumed in the year for which the premium
is paid, and in no sense is that portion of the premium returned to
the corporation's capital by its collection of the insurance proceeds.
Nevertheless, until the Service's ruling is revoked, a taxpayer is
surely entitled to follow it.
When a redemption of stock constitutes a section 301 distribu-
tion, because, for example, the redemption is essentially equivalent
to a dividend, the effect of the distribution on the corporation's
earnings and profits is determined in the same manner as a distri-
bution to a shareholder which is not made in redemption of stock.''
If the redemption constitutes a purchase of a shareholder's stock
under section 302(a), or a partial liquidation under section 331 (a)(2),
the distribution in redemption will reduce earnings and profits to
the extent that the distribution is not properly chargeable to capital
account." 2 The correct method for computing the amount of distri-
bution which is properly chargeable to capital account is unsettled.
The unresolved questions include: (1) whether the corporation's
capital account is to be determined by the fair market value of
property and services given to the corporation in payment for its
stock or merely by the tax basis of the property given to the corpo-
ration; (2) the effect of the corporation's having several classes of
stock with different rights; and (3) whether the amount of distribu-
tion which reduces earnings and profits is limited to the distributee's
110. Part of the premium is attributable to costs (including commissions), but, ex-
cept for the first few annual payments, costs constitute only a small portion of such a
premium.
111. The earnings and profits of the corporation are reduced by the amount of
cash distributed plus the adjusted basis to the corporation of property distributed in
kind. INT. RE V. CODE of 1954, § 312(a). This reduction is subject to certain modifications
when liabilities are transferred to the shareholder or when the distributing corporation
recognizes gain on the distribution of its assets. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 312(c).
112. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 312(e); see Edelstein & Korbel, The Impact of Re-
demption and Liquidation Distributions on Earnings and Profits: Tax Accounting
Aberations Under § 312(e), 20 TAx L. REV. 479 (1965). A redemption may appear to
qualify as a purchase under the auspices of an agreement filed pursuant to § 302(c)
and may subsequently be treated as a dividend on the ground that the distributee
acquired an interest in the corporation within the ten-year period. It is uncertain
whether the change in earnings and profits caused by the loss of § 302(c) treatment
will be prospective from the date the distributee acquired the prohibited interest or
whether the change will be imposed retroactively.
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ratable share of the corporation's earnings and profits,113 or instead
is an amount equal to the difference between the amount received
by the distributee and the distributee's ratable share of the corpora-
tion's capital account.114 To understand the significance of the third
question, the following hypothetical may be useful.
III-B-1. A and B formed the X Corporation and each contributed
$10,000 cash for one hundred shares of the stock of X. After two
years of operation, X had accumulated earnings and profits of $15,000,
and the fair market value of X was $50,000. X then redeemed A's
one hundred shares of stock for $25,000. If the reduction in earnings
and profits of X were limited to A's ratable share of the earnings and
profits, then the amount of reduction would be $7,500 (50% X
S15,000). However, if the reduction in earnings and profits is deter-
mined by the difference between the amount distributed to A
($25,000) and A's ratable share of the capital account (50% X
$20,000 = $10,000), then the $15,000 earnings and profits would be
reduced to zero."15
The amount of reduction in earnings and profits caused by a
stock redemption will almost always be different from the amount of
increment to earnings and profits caused by the receipt of life in-
surance proceeds, since the two figures are derived from unrelated
sources. If the increment to earnings and profits from the insurance
proceeds exceeds the reduction caused by the redemption, a net
effect of the entity purchase-viewing the collection of the insurance
and the.redemption of the stock as a single integrated transaction-
is to increase the corporation's earnings and profits.1 6 But a cor-
poration is permitted to reduce its earnings and profits by a portion
of the premiums paid for insurance; and since the reduction to
earnings and profits previously enjoyed by the corporation is not
restored upon the collection of the insurance proceeds,"s7 the total
impact on the corporation's earnings and profits usually will not be
significant. Indeed, in some cases, the total reduction to earnings
and profits caused by the payment of premiums and the stock re-
demption may exceed the increment caused by receipt of the insur-
113. See Woodward Inv. Co., 46 B.T.A. 648 (1942), acq., 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 20.
114. See Helvering v. Jarvis, 123 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1941). See also G.C.M. 23460,
1942-2 Cumr. BULL. 190, in which the Service contends that Jarvis is reconcilable with
Woodward Inv. Co., B.T.A. 648 (1942), acq., 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 20.
115. B. BIrrrKR & J. EusricE, supra note 13, § 7.85, at 323-25.
116. A net increase in earnings and profits could cause adverse tax consequences
either under the accumulated earnings tax provisions or by a characterization of subse-
quent corporate distributions to shareholders as dividends.
117. Rev. Rul. 54-230, 1954-1 CuM, BULL. 114.
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ance proceeds, and the resulting net reduction is something of a
windfall.
In most cases, the primary tax effect to the corporation of the
receipt of insurance proceeds for a redemption will be the result
of the effect on earnings and profits, because the proceeds of life
insurance are ordinarily excluded from the gross income of the
recipient.11 An important exception to this exclusion is the so-called
"transfer-for-value rule": when a life insurance policy is transferred
for consideration prior to maturity, the transferee will recognize as
gross income the excess of the proceeds of such insurance over the
sum of the consideration paid by the transferee plus premiums sub-
sequently paid by him." 9 However, there are several exceptions to
the transfer-for-value rule, one of which excludes from income in-
surance proceeds payable to a corporate transferee when the insured
is either a shareholder or an officer of the corporation. 120 Thus, if
the corporation purchases a policy from the insured for valuable
consideration, 12' the insurance proceeds received by the corporation
on maturity will be excluded from the corporation's gross income.
The transfer-for-value rule may create difficulties when insurance
funding is used for a cross-purchase agreement, 22 and therefore one
of the advantages of the entity purchase is the avoidance of that rule.
The tax consequences to the corporation are not the only tax
considerations relevant in using life insurance funding for a buy-
out. There are also potential tax difficulties for the estate of a dece-
dent--difficulties which inhere in the nature of insurance funding.
One significant danger arises from the inevitable consequence that
when a corporation is the beneficiary of an insurance policy, the
receipt of the proceeds of that policy will increase the net worth of
the corporation so that the value of the outstanding shares of the
corporation's stock will be proportionately increased. The resulting
increase in the value of the decedent's stock will normally be re-
flected in the stock's estate tax valuation. 2 3 But this increase in the
estate tax value of the decedent's stock can be finessed if the buy-
118. IN'. REv. CODE of 1954, § 101(a)(1).
119. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(a)(2).
120. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(a)(2)(B); see note 231 infra.
121. The corporation might have purchased the policy from its shareholder because
the shareholder was uninsurable at the time the redemption plan was adopted or
simply because the annual premium on an older policy is smaller.
122. See text accompanying notes 231-33 infra.
123. Annie S. Kennedy, 4 B.T.A. 330 (1926). See also Newell v. Commissioner, 66
F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1933). In effect, then, a portion of the insurance proceeds is reflected
in decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes,
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out agreement establishes a price for the decedent's stock according
to a formula or figure that does not include the increment in value
caused by the collection of the insurance proceeds, and if the re-
demption price of the stock qualifies as determinative of the estate
tax value of the stock.124 It is arguable, although the Service has not
yet raised the issue, that when the price established in the buy-out
agreement expressly excludes life insurance 'proceeds, the established
price is not bona fide and therefore is not determinative of the estate
tax value. Nevertheless, in most circumstances, the exclusion of
insurance proceeds should not render the redemption price un-
reasonable.
The estate tax provisions of the Code also present a danger
that proceeds from an insurance policy owned by the corporation
will be included in the estate of a deceased shareholder. This dan-
ger will arise primarily from the inadvertance of a shareholder-
or his estate planner-and can be easily avoided with careful plan-
ning. When an insured dies possessing incidents of ownership in
a policy on his life, whether such incidents were exercisable alone
or in conjunction with any other person, the full amount of the
insurance proceeds are included in the insured's gross estate for
estate tax purposes.125 Incidents of ownership include the right
to change the beneficiary of the policy, the right to borrow from
the insurer against the cash surrender value of the policy, and the
power to surrender or cancel the policy.126 The regulations pro-
vide that even if the incidents of ownership possessed by an in-
sured are held in a solely fiduciary capacity-for example, as a
trustee with no beneficial interest in the trust-the insurance pro-
ceeds will nonetheless be included in his estate. 2 7 Thus, if a
124. For the position of the Government as to when the price established in the
buy-out agreement is determinative of the stock's estate tax value, see Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-2(h) (1958); Rev. Rul. 59-60, § 8, 1959-1 Cum. Buuz. 237, 243-44. See also text
accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
125. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042(2). Insurance proceeds will also be included
in a decedent's gross estate if they are payable to the insured's executor in that capacity,
without regard to the possession of incidents of ownership. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 2012(l). Moreover, the insured's possession of certain incidents of ownership, such as
a power to change the beneficiary, is likely to cause adverse income tax consequences
in that the premiums paid by the corporation may be treated as constructive dividends
to the insured shareholder. See note 93 supra; Abrams, Tax Planning for Agreements
Disposing of a Shareholder's Closely Held Stock at Death, 57 GEO. L.J. 1211, 1223 (1969).
126. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958).
127. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(4) (1958). In Estate of Harry R. Freuhauf, 50 T.C.
915 (1968), appeal docketed, No. 19,535, 6th Cir., April 21, 1969, the majority of the
Tax Court held that incidents of ownership held by an insured in a fiduciary capacity
were sufficient to trigger § 2042 and thereby to cause inclusion of the proceeds in the
insured's estate. However, four of the Tax Court judges, while concurring with the
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deceased shareholder dies possessing incidents of ownership in poli-
cies on his life which are held by the corporation, the full amount
of the proceeds of those policies will be included in his gross es-
tate.128 When he is an officer or director of the corporation, it is
arguable that he, in conjunction with the other officers or directors,
possesses incidents of ownership, such as the power to change benefi-
ciaries or to borrow against the policy. The possession of such
powers, even though exercisable only with the consent of others,
could cause the inclusion of the insurance proceeds in the insured's
estate. 12 The regulations provide that if a corporation is owned
solely by one shareholder, its power to change the beneficiary of a
policy on the shareholder's life is deemed an incident of ownership
belonging to that shareholder. 30 It is possible that this "attribution"
of incidents of ownership may apply also to a shareholder who
owns less than one hundred per cent of the corporation, 13' partic-
ularly if he serves as an officer or director of the company. Al-
though there appear to be no cases in which incidents of ownership
have been found in an insured solely by virtue of his position as
a director or officer of the corporation which owns the policy, the
danger remains that the Service will raise that issue in future
cases. 32 Accordingly, the insured should make certain that he is
excluded from participating in any decisions concerning the insur-
ance on his life, regardless of the capacity in which he would
otherwise participate.
When an individual dies possessing incidents of ownership in life
insurance held by a corporation, the insurance proceeds are in-
cluded in his gross estate, even if the estate is obligated to surren-
der the decedent's stock in order to obtain those proceeds. In the
latter event, however, in order to avoid double taxation, the value
of the decedent's stock for estate tax purposes is then reduced by the
amount of insurance proceeds to be applied against the redemp-
result reached, stated that the rule of the case should be restricted to narrower grounds
in conformity with the facts-the insured was not only the trustee of the insurance
trust, but he was also an income beneficiary, and his power to surrender the policies
and to reinvest the proceeds could affect his income interest.
128. HaHl v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959); Estate of Grant H. Piggott,
32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68,061 (1963).
129. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2042-1(c)(2), (4) (1958).
180. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958). See also Cockrill v. O'Hara, P-H FEDERAL
TAxEs: ESrATE & GirF (24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 147,402 (M.D. Tenn. May 15, 1969).
131. The mention in the regulations of only sole stockholders does raise a negative
inference that the principle is limited to that dass, but it is a very weak inference.
132. Cf. Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Estate of Bert L.
Fuchs, 47 T.C. 199 (1966).
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tion price.13a But when a buy-out agreement establishes the estate
tax value of a decedent's stock, exclusive of the increase in value
resulting from collection of the insurance proceeds, and when the
insurance proceeds are included in the decedent's gross estate be-
cause of retained incidents of ownership, the Service might well
contend that there would not be a double inclusion if the full
value of both the stock and the insurance proceeds were included
in the decedent's gross estate, and that accordingly both should
be included. 34
Moreover, if a corporation used life insurance proceeds to re-
deem a decedent's stock, but the corporation was not obligated to
use them for that purpose, there is some danger that the estate
tax value of the stock will not be reduced by the insurance pro-
ceeds, even when the latter are also included in the decedent's
gross estate because of retained incidents of ownership. While that
would constitute a double inclusion which courts may well abhor,
it would be prudent to avoid the risk.
b. Settlement options. When life insurance is used as a means
of funding a stock purchase plan, the parties should consider the
benefits of the several settlement options 35 permitted under the
policy. Such options include an interest-only or deposit option,13
a fixed period option, 37 a fixed amount option, 138 an annuity op-
133. E.g., Estate of Ray E. Tompkins, 13 T.C. 1054 (1949), acq., 1950-I Curm'. BULL.
5; Estate of John T.H. Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938), acq., 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 20. While
Mitchel involved a cross-purchase agreement and Tompkins involved a cross-purchase
of a partnership interest, the rationale of those cases is clearly applicable to the entity
purchase as well.
134. See First Natl. Bank v. United States, 14 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6189 (N.D. Ga.
1964), revd. on other grounds, 358 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1966). The purpose of excluding
the insurance proceeds in valuing the decedent's stock is to prevent an escalation of
value when insurance is used in funding. See example III-B-2 infra.
135. For a helpful discussion of the available options see Dillon, Settlement
Options-Their Benefits and Limitations, 57 ILL. B.J. 306 (1968).
136. Under an interest-only option or a deposit option, the insurance proceeds are
left with the insurer and the benficiary receives interest thereon at a guaranteed mini-
mum rate. Customarily, but not inevitably, an interest-only option will permit the
beneficiary to withdraw all or part of the insurance proceeds on demand, and fre-
quently the beneficiary will have the right to elect other settlement options, although
the latter right may be limited to a specific time period after the insured's death (usually
one or two )ears).
137. Under the fixed period option, the insurance proceeds are paid out in install-
ments over a fixed period of time. Since the policy provides a guaranteed minimum
interest, the minimum amount of each payment is certain; and if the policy earns more
than the minimum interest, the payment for that period is larger, but the number
of payments is not increased.
138. In a fixed amount option, the amount of each periodic payment is fixed,
and the minimum number of such payments is established according to the guaranteed
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tion,139 a self-and-survivor annuity option,140 a joint-and-survivor
annuity option,141 an annuity option with refund features, 42 an
annuity option with guaranteed payments, 143 and combinations of
these possibilities. 44 Under most of these options, proceeds which
are retained by the insurer for later payment will earn interest; the
minimum rate guaranteed by most policies written in the past two
decades ranges from 2 to 2 per cent, and some present policies
guarantee as much as 3 per cent. At this time, however, the actual
interest paid by insurers is greater than the guaranteed minimum;
in fact, most policies are returning 4 to 4V per cent interest.
If the shareholder desires to elect one of the settlement op-
tions available under the policy, or wishes to permit such an elec-
tion to be made after his death, the insurance proceeds may be
made payable to a trustee or, in some circumstances, made payable
directly to persons named by the shareholder. In either event, the
insurance payment must be conditioned on the surrender of the de-
ceased shareholder's stock. When the recipient of the insurance
proceeds is a trustee, there will usually be no difficulty in im-
posing that condition; the trust instrument will instruct the trustee
not to distribute the proceeds to the insured's estate or legatees
minimum interest; if the policy earns more than the minimum interest, the number
of payments is increased, but the dollar amount of each payment is not affected.
189. A straight annuity is the periodic payment of a fixed dollar amount during
the life of the beneficiary. A variable annuity is also paid for the life of the beneficiary,
but the dollar amount of the periodic payments varies according to the success of the
investments. Insurance policies do not now offer variable annuities, but there are
indications that they may begin offering that option in the future. But see note
149 infra.
140. A self-and-survivor annuity is the periodic payment of a fixed dollar amount
to a beneficiary during his life, and, after his death, the periodic payment of another
fixed dollar amount (which may be smaller than that paid to the first beneficiary, but
need not be) to a second beneficiary for life.
141. A joint-and-survivor annuity is the periodic payment of a fixed dollar amount
to two beneficiaries for their joint lives and to the survivor of the two beneficiaries for
his life. The phrase "joint-and-survivor annuity" is often used to describe an option
that is actually a self-and-survivor annuity (see note 140 supra).
142. An annuity with a refund feature is an annuity which provides that if the
beneficiary dies before receiving a certain dollar amount, the difference shall be
paid to the beneficiary's estate or to a third party.
143. When an annuity contains a provision for guaranteed payments, the insurer
guarantees that if the annuitant should die within a stated period of time (such as
five, ten, or fifteen years), the insurer will continue to make payments for the guaranteed
period of the same amount that would have been payable if the annuitant were still
living. These guaranteed payments can be made payable to a contingent beneficiary.
Of course, if the annuitant survives the guaranteed period, the annuity payments will
be made for the duration of his life.
144. These options do provide some flexibility. For example, it is possible to have
a fixed-period option under which a larger periodic payment is made during the period
of a child's minority and the payments are reduced when the child attains his majority.
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until the stock is surrendered. The same result can be achieved
if the shareholder's stock is held in escrow by the trustee during
the shareholder's life. 45 When a trustee is the beneficiary of the
policy and the election of a settlement option is desired, it may
be necessary to obtain the prior consent of the insurance company
to the trustee's election of an option, since the terms of insurance
policies frequently do not permit a fiduciary to receive proceeds
under a settlement option. Many insurance companies, however,
upon request will amend the policy's provisions to permit such
an election, and this amendment should be executed before the
shareholder's death. Furthermore, the trust instrument should ex-
pressly authorize the trustee to utilize the settlement options.
When the insurance proceeds are made payable to an individ-
ual beneficiary, rather than to a trustee, and when the distribution
to the individual beneficiary is conditioned on the surrender of the
shareholder's stock, it would be prudent to incorporate that restric-
tion in the designation of the beneficiary. For example, the desig-
nation of beneficiary clause might read:
To A if he survives the insured and if the insurer receives written
notice from the president of the X Corporation, a Delaware corpora-
tion, within one year after the insured's death that all of the in-
sured's stock of X has been surrendered to X; and if A fails to
survive the insured, or if the insurer does not receive such written
notice from the president of X within one year after the insured's
death, the proceeds shall be distributed to the X Corporation.
In most circumstances, it will be preferable to name a trustee as
beneficiary; but if the insurer will not permit a trustee to elect
among the policy's settlement options, the policy may provide for
payment to an individual beneficiary as long as the insurer agrees
to accept the attendant restrictions on distribution.
While settlement options are useful in some circumstances, care-
ful consideration should be given to other available choices. De-
pending upon the desired goals, a lump-sum distribution of the
insurance proceeds to a trustee, either for immediate payment to
a named beneficiary or to be held in trust under the terms of a
145. If the corporation has made an election under subchapter S (INT. REV. CODE of
1954, §§ 1371-78), the trustee should not hold a shareholder's stock since that entails
some risk that the subchapter S election will be terminated. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1371-
1(e) (1959), 1.1372-4(b)(3) (1959). But see A & N Furniture & Appliance Co. v. United
States, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1487 (S.D. Ohio 1967). While one writer has suggested that
stock may be held in escrow without violating the prohibition against trustees holding
subchapter S stock [Crumbley, Buy and Sell Agreements for Subchapter S Corporations,
108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 17 (1969)], the in terrorem aspect of the risk of terminating an
election is likely to deter all but the bravest from using escrow arrangements.
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trust instrument, will frequently be more desirable. The choice
between using a trust arrangement or a settlement option should
rest on an evaluation of the parties' goals and of the relative ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each method in light of those goals. 146
Trust arrangements are far more flexible than settlement op-
tions; if the trust assets are invested wisely, the trust should pro-
duce a much higher yield than that obtained from insurance
options which provide a relatively low rate of return. The trust
provides better protection against the present inflationary spiral;
and particularly when the beneficiaries are minor children, the
flexibility of a trust may be needed. The trust vehicle, however,
usually involves costs not associated with insurance, such as legal
fees for creating the trust and trustee fees for administering it. If
the proceeds are relatively small, 147 the costs of the trust arrange-
ment may outweigh its advantages. For example, although the fees
of a professional fiduciary are determined by the size of the trust
estate and the annual trust income, there is usually a minimum
fee which could make a small trust uneconomical. Nevertheless,
trustee fees, and perhaps some of the legal fees incurred in cre-
ating the trust, will usually be deductible for income tax purposes
under section 212 of the Code; consequently, only the net ex-
penses of the trust arrangement-the fees less the tax savings en-
joyed by deducting them-should be considered.
On the other hand, the insurance options provide greater secu-
rity. There is virtually no risk of loss, and a recession in the
economy will have less effect on insurance than on almost any
other investment. There are no direct costs for managing the in-
surance proceeds, and when small amounts are involved, costs can
be a substantial factor. Moreover, if the beneficiary of the insur-
ance is the surviving spouse of the insured, there may be a small
tax advantage to using an insurance option: if the proceeds are pay-
able to the surviving spouse in installments over a period of years,
such as is the case in an annuity option, the interest portion of the
installment payments may be exempt from federal income tax in
an amount up to 1,000 dollars per year.1 41 While this exemption
is advantageous, particularly if the surviving spouse is in a high
income tax bracket, some commentators have exaggerated its use-
146. For a slightly biased, but nevertheless relevent, discussion of the circumstances
in which settlement options may be useful, see Snitzer, Investment Growth Through
Settlement Options, 108 TRuSTS & EsTATEs 204 (1969).
147. In making this determination, S25,000 is frequently named as a rule of thumb
amount of demarcation.
148. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 101(d).
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fulness. If the spouse is in a thirty per cent income tax bracket,
for example, the maximum benefit of the exemption is 300 dollars
per year. There is no reason to scorn that amount, but it does
not warrant distorting an entire estate plan.
Insurance companies are making considerable efforts to make
settlements options more flexible; and as more such companies
enter the mutual fund business, it is likely that in the not-too-
distant future they will offer variable annuities.149 Consequently,
the available options must be scrutinized carefully in each case
and reviewed at periodic intervals, since favorable changes may
occur rapidly in this area. Unless life insurance options become
as flexible as trust arrangements-an unlikely event since insur-
ance companies are not staffed to make discretionary determi-
nations as to distributions-the trust will continue to have an
advantage in that regard. But the two are not mutually exclusive;
in some cases it may be desirable to split the insurance proceeds
between settlement options and a trust arrangement, thereby pro-
viding both a hedge 'against inflation and a minimum floor of
security.
When the widow of a deceased shareholder is to be the ultimate
recipient of the insurance proceeds, it is desirable that any settle-
ment option selected prior to the shareholder's death be one that
will qualify for the marital deduction allowance.150 Generally, no
marital deduction will be allowed for insurance proceeds which are
made payable in a manner which contravenes the terminable interest
rule.1'5 But an important exception to this rule is that a terminable
interest in the insurance proceeds will qualify for the marital deduc-
149. See note 135 supra. One of the difficulties encountered by insurance companies
that wish to adopt a variable annuity is that such plans will probably constitute a
security and will therefore be subject to the regulations and restrictions imposed by
state and federal governments on the sale of securities. See SEC v. United Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). Some of
these restrictions might be incompatible with insurance goals.
150. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056. When the insurance proceeds are paid to the
widow in exchange for the decedent's stock, and when the redemption of the stock
is mandatory, the property transferred from the decedent to the widow will probably
be deumed the insurance proceeds rather than the stock, and the qualifications for de-
ductibility will almost certainly be measured against those proceeds.
151. INir. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b)(1) disallows a deduction for the transfer of
property to a surviving spouse if the transfer will terminate on the lapse of time or
on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a specific event and if, by reason of such termina-
tion, an interest in the property will pass to a third party who received his interest in
the property from the decedent for less than full and adequate consideration in money
or money's worth. Thus, insurance proceeds payable to the widow under a joint and
sun,ivor annuity option, with the widow and her daughter as beneficiaries, will not
qualify; nor will an annuity with a refund feature unless the provisions of § 2056(b)(6)
are satisfied, or unless the refund is pa)able to the estate of the surviving spouse.
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tion if the surviving spouse has the power to appoint the property to
herself or to her estate and if the other conditions of section 2056
(b)(6) of the Code are satisfied. 162
Additional care is necessary when dealing with redemptions
under section 303 of the Code.153 While section 303 is not limited
exclusively to redemptions of stock from the probate estate of a
decedent, 5 4 the regulations state that it does not apply to redemp-
tions of stock acquired from the decedent's estate in satisfaction
of a specific pecuniary bequest. 55 Consequently, if the decedent's
stock is to be distributed to his widow, or to a marital trust, in
satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest-including a bequest defined
in terms of a marital deduction pecuniary formula-and if a re-
demption under section 303 is contemplated, the stock should first
be redeemed from the decedent's estate and then the proceeds
distributed to the widow or to the marital trust.
c. Merits and disadvantages of insurance funding. When life
insurance is acquired by a corporation to fund a stock purchase
agreement, the receipt of the proceeds of the insurance will increase
the value of the deceased shareholder's stock proportionately; and if
the stock is to be redeemed at fair market value, the corporation will
need sufficient liquid assets to cover the increment in value caused
by the insurance. Of course, the corporation could acquire addi-
tional insurance to fund the obligation, but such additional in-
surance would further raise the value of the decedent's stock, and
thus the corporation's dollar obligation would pyramid upward. The
following example illustrates this problem:
III-B-2. The outstanding shares of the X Corporation were owned
equally by A and B. X had a net worth of $400,000; consequently
the value of each shareholder's stock was $200,000. X purchased life
insurance in the amount of $200,000 on A, and a like amount on
B, in order to fund a stock redemption plan. X was the beneficiary
of the policies. A died shortly after the insurance was acquired. After
A's death and the collection of the proceeds, the net worth of X was
$600,000, and the value of each shareholder's stock was $300,000.
Consequently, X needed $100,000 liquid assets in addition to the
insurance proceeds to redeem A's stock. If, in anticipation of that
152. The conditions of § 2056(b)(6) are discussed in Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6 (1958).
153. See note 15 supra.
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.303-2(f) (1955).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.303-2(f) (1955). The validity of this regulation has been ques-
tioned. Meyer, Redemption of Stock in the Close Corporation To Pay Death Taxes,
N.Y.U. 27TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 401, 403-05 (1969); cf. United States v. Lake, 406 F.2d
941 (5th Cir. 1969) (construing the regulation narrowly).
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obligation, X had purchased an additional $100,000 insurance on the
life of each shareholder, its net worth on A's death would have been
$700,000, and the value of A's stock $350,000. The corporation could
have funded the additional $50,000 with insurance also, but that
would further raise the net worth, requiring still more insurance to
fund the purchase. Obviously, such an arrangement is self-defeating;
the principal beneficiaries are the insurance company and its agents.
The escalation of insurance coverage can be finessed by using
a stock redemption agreement to establish a price for the share-
holder's stock in such a manner that the insurance proceeds are
omitted from the valuation formula. 15 The principal drawback
of this arrangement is that the deceased shareholder will not re-
ceive payment for the true value of his stock; thus the transaction
favors those shareholders who survive:
III-B-3. The X Corporation had two equal shareholders, A and B.
The corporation and the shareholders executed a stock redemption
agreement under which X agreed to redeem the stock of the first
shareholder to die at a price equal to 50% of the net worth of the
corporation exclusive of insurance proceeds. X acquired insurance of
$200,000 on the life of A and a like amount on B. When A died, the
net worth of the corporation, exclusive of insurance proceeds, was
$400,000, and consequently X redeemed A's shares for $200,000.
However, the actual net worth of the cbrporation was $600,000;
therefore A received $100,000 less than the actual value of his interest.
The exclusion of the insurance proceeds from the redemption
price may be justifiable if A dies shortly after the insurance is pur-
chased, since in that event the proceeds result from A's death
rather than from the corporation's earnings. But even then, it might
be questioned why B should derive a windfall from the death of
his fellow shareholder. Moreover, if A's death occurs many years
after the insurance is purchased, and if the insurance used is or-
dinary life, a significant portion of the insurance proceeds payable
on A's death represents the corporation's equity in the policy. Since
that equity was derived from premiums paid from corporate earn-
ings, the redemption agreement's forfeiture of A's interest in it
is harsh. This problem can be resolved by limiting the exclusion
of insurance proceeds from the purchase price to the excess of the
proceeds over the cash surrender value of the policy.
156. Of course, the agreement should also be designed so that the redemption price
will fix the value of the stock for estate tax purposes, and so that the deceased share-
holder will not possess any incidents of ownership in the policy at his death, since that
would result in the inclusion of the proceeds in his taxable estate. INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 2042. See text accompanying notes 8-12, 125-34 supra.
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The above discussion, however, does not mean that a deceased
shareholder derives no benefit from a plan of this kind or that
such a plan should not be adopted. The decedent's estate does
obtain a market for liquidating the stock promptly. But the primary
advantage of the arrangement is that it permits a surviving share-
holder to continue a business which otherwise might have to be
liquidated. It might be suggested that few investors are so unself-
ishly devoted to the continuity of their businesses that they would
wish to forfeit large sums of money to further that end. But at
the time that the redemption agreement is executed, the identity
of the surviving shareholder is a mystery, and if the forfeiture of
a significant sum by the first to die is necessary for the contin-
uance of the business, the parties may wish to gamble as to who
that will be. It should be made clear to them, however, that they
are gambling and that the first to die will be a financial loser.
The gamble may be desirable for business reasons, but it is impor-
tant that the parties recognize it for what it is and not delude
themselves with a myth that a deceased shareholder will be paid the
full value of his stock.
Of course, the liquidation value of a business is usually sub-
stantially less than its value as a going concern, and consequently,
in some cases, the amount paid to a deceased shareholder's estate
reflects in part the loss that would be suffered if the business were
liquidated. In fact, the amount paid may be even more than would
be possible if liquidation were necessary.
An important decision to be made with respect to insurance
funding is the selection of the kind of insurance. Usually the best
choice is either ordinary life or declining term insurance. 157 Ordi-
nary life insurance comprises two separate property interests: (1)
a reserve (or equity) in the policy which reflects the policyholder's
investment plus interest earned thereon, and (2) coverage against
the risk that the insured will die during the policy period. As
the equity grows larger over the years, the amount of insurance
risk coverage-the difference between the face value of the policy
and the equity therein-declines. Declining term'5 8 is pure insur-
ance; the policyholder has no equity in the policy. The amount of
157. Occasionally, group term life insurance may be used for funding. See Walker,
Life Insurance from the Standpoint of the Federal Corporate and Personal Income Tax,
Gift Tax and Estate Tax, U. So. CAL. 1966 TAx INSTITUTE 543, 588-93. For a recent
statement of the Service's position on the effectiveness of an assignment of group term
life insurance for estate tax purposes, see Rev. Rul. 69-54, 1969-6 INT. REv. BULL. 20.
See also Landorf v. United States, 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
158. See notes 102, 104 supra.
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insurance coverage under declining term is reduced periodically.
Thus, if liquid assets are to be available when a shareholder dies,
it is necessary to complement declining term with a periodic invest-
ment program. The amount invested periodically could, for ex-
ample, be the difference between an ordinary life premium and
the smaller declining term premium.
There are several sophisticated plans for purchasing what
amounts to declining term life insurance at a smaller cost than that
charged for the outright purchase of such a policy. The most com-
mon technique is to purchase ordinary life insurance and each year
to "borrow" from the insurer an amount equal to the policy's cash
surrender value, using the "borrowed" funds as partial or full pay-
ment for the policy's premium plus the interest accrued on prior
loans. This type of insurance plan is frequently referred to as "min-
ium deposit insurance." Since the amount lent will increase each
year, since the owner maintains little equity in the policy, and
since the insurer will collect the loans from the insurance proceeds
on maturity, the net effect of the minimum deposit insurance plan
is to acquire a declining term policy-that is, the amount payable
to the insured's beneficiary decreases each year when an additional
loan is made. Minimum deposit insurance is used primarily by
persons in high income tax brackets. The cash surrender value (a
rough estimate of the owner's equity in the policy) increases each
year, but the rate of increase is lower than the rate of interest pay-
able on funds borrowed from the insurance company by the owner.
The rate of increase, for example, may be 2 per cent while the
loan may bear interest of 5 per cent. Thus, the owner pays a
greater amount of interest on his loans than he earns on his invest-
ment in the policy made with those borrowed funds. The incre-
ments in cash value of the policy, however, do not constitute taxable
income to the owner,15 nor will they be taxed to the beneficiaries
of the policy on maturity.160 If the owner is permitted to take an
income tax deduction for his interest payments, the net cost of the
loans may be less than the increments in the policy's value. Al-
though section 264 of the Code prohibits the deduction of interest
paid on loans incurred pursuant to a systematic borrowing plan
for the purchase of life insurance or of endowment or annuity con-
tracts, it makes several explicit exceptions. The most useful of these
permits deduction of the interest if no part of any four of the
159. Theodore H. Cohen, 39 T.C. 1055 (1963).
160. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101.
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annual premiums due during the first seven years' 6' of the policy
is paid with borrowed funds,162 and if the amount of loans made
thereafter to the policy owner does not exceed the amount of
premiums paid to the insurer for years subsequent to the fourth
year in which the premium was paid without borrowing. 0 3 Thus,
in effect, the premiums paid for those four years must be left with
the insurer and not withdrawn as loans at some subsequent date,
especially not within the first seven-year period of the policy.
If a corporation-or an individual--owns a policy on the life
of a shareholder and wishes to purchase additional life insurance
coverage through a minimum deposit insurance plan, it may ex-
change its existing policy for a new one issued by the same insurer
but having a greater principal sum. Its reserve in its existing policy
will constitute premium payments for the new policy, and any un-
paid premium due for the first four years of the new policy can be
paid in cash. Since section 1035 of the Code is likely to preclude the
recognition of gain on such an exchange, this arrangement can be
a relatively painless method for acquiring minimum deposit in-
surance while complying with the requirements of section 264 for
the deduction of interest payments made on subsequent loans bor-
rowed against the policy's reserve value.
But the minimum deposit insurance plan can be advantageous
even if no interest deduction is allowed. When a policy owner has
a liquidity shortage,6 4 systematic borrowing permits him to main-
tain a high level of insurance coverage; and when his liquidity pro-
blems are resolved, he can pay subsequent premiums outright and
perhaps repay the outstanding loans.
Although premiums on an ordinary life insurance policy will
be greater than those on a declining term policy, the choice be-
tween the two should not be made on this basis alone. Premiums
on an ordinary life policy represent two things-payment for in-
surance risk coverage and an investment in the policy-whereas
premiums on a declining term policy represent only the cost of in-
surance. 65 Normally, the money which is saved by purchasing de-
161. If there is, at any time, a substantial increase in the premium amount, the
seven-year period begins anew. Treas. Reg. § 1.264-4(d)(1) (1964).
162. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 264(c)(1).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.264-4(d)(1) (1964).
164. But if a shortage is due to a substantial loss of income or to a substantial in-
crease in financial obligations which was unforeseeable at the time the insurance con-
tract was entered into, an interest deduction is permitted under an exception to the
general rule. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 264(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.264-4(d)(3) (1964).
165. Actually, the pure insurance cost factor in an ordinary life premium is less
than the premium for a like amount of declining term insurance.
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clining term will be invested in other markets. Hence, the decision
should be made on the basis of an evaluation of investment oppor-
tunities. If the best available investment is in an insurance policy,
ordinary life should be chosen; otherwise, declining term is
preferable."'
Insurance provides security of both income and capital, but the
rate of return is small. However, as previously noted,167 the equity in
an insurance policy earns interest which is reflected in increments in
cash surrender value, and that interest is not included in the policy-
holder's gross income for income tax purposes. 68 This income tax
exclusion may be an important consideration in selecting an invest-
ment. On the other hand, investments in stocks, securities, or real
estate may yield a substantially greater return than insurance does,
and the unrealized appreciation of such investments is not taxed.
Moreover, a funded reserve may be utilized by the corporation to
further its business interests. The corporation, for example, could
use a funded reserve to construct a building which the corporation
would occupy; on the death of a shareholder, the building could
be sold or distributed in kind to the decedent's estate as part of
the redemption price.
3. Payment with Promissory Notes
If a corporation lacks sufficient liquid assets to redeem a share-
holder's stock within a few years after his death, it can use its own
personal notes as partial or full payment of the redemption price.
When such notes are given within the time period permitted under
section 303 of the Code, 6 D the tax relief afforded by that section
is available, even if the payments on the notes extend beyond the
statutory period. 7o It is important, however, that the corporation's
notes do not constitute an equity interest in the corporation, be-
cause if they do, and are therefore treated as hybrid stock, the "in-
166. For an unabashed polemic against the use of ordinary life insurance rather
than term insurance, see J. PAWLICK, How TO AVOID BEING OVERCHARGED BY YOUR LIFE
INSURANCE SALESMAN (1968).
167. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
168. Abram Nesbitt, II, 43 T.C. 629 (1965); Theodore H. Cohen, 39 T.C. 1055 (1963).
Dividends received by a policyholder from a mutual insurance company constitute a
partial refund of the premium paid by the policyholder and therefore are excluded
from the policyholder's gross income. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 316(b)(1); S.M. 5680,
V-1 Cum. BULL. 32 (1926). However, the interest earned on dividends which were re-
ceived from a mutual insurance policy, but were left with the insurer to earn interest,
is included in the policyholder's gross income. Theodore H. Cohen, 39 T.C. 1055 (1963).
169. See note 15 supra and notes 171-73 infra and accompanying text.
170. Rev. Rul. 65-289, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 86; Rev. Rul. 67-425, 1967-2 CuI. BULL. 134.
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terest" paid on the notes cannot be deducted by the corporation
on its income tax returns, and the payments made on the notes
will be treated as a redemption of stock which may well cause
ordinary dividend income to the recipient. If the notes represent
equity interests in the corporation, payments made on these notes
after the statutory period defined in section 303171 will not lie within
the protective umbrella of that section.
Normally, four precautions are sufficient to avoid the character-
ization of notes as equity interests: (1) the debt-capital ratio should
not be overbalanced in favor of debt; (2) the maturity dates of
the notes should not be far removed from the date of issue,172 pre-
ferably no more than five years;' 73 (3) the notes should not be sub-
ordinate to the claims of creditors; and (4) the notes should bear
a reasonable rate of interest. Business considerations may not per-
mit the parties to take all of these precautions, but the precautions
should be followed to the extent that they are feasible.
The use of promissory notes to redeem stock can be helpful
even when section 303 is inapplicable. The corporation, for ex-
ample, may issue its notes in redemption of all of a shareholder's
stock; such a redemption should qualify as a purchase under section
302(b)(3) of the Code, rather than as a dividend, provided that
there are no attribution problems1T4 and that the corporate notes
are not treated as hybrid stock. If attribution exists only because
stock is owned by members of the shareholder's family, that attri-
bution can sometimes be avoided by utilizing the relief afforded by
section 302(c).1 5
If the parties to a buy-out agreement anticipate the use of prom-
issory notes to finance the purchase, they should provide in advance
171. The statutory period usually lasts about 41 years after the deceased share-
holder's death, but the period may be extended if an estate tax deficiency is litigated
in a Tax Court proceeding. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 303(b)(1).
172. The Service has announced that it will not issue rulings on the applicability
of § 302(b) to corporate redemptions financed by notes which are to be paid over "a
long future period." Rev. Proc. 64-31, § 3.01-5(b), 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 947, 949. Pre-
sumably, that announcement will also apply to § 303 redemptions. See note 173 infra.
173. If it is necessary, and if the parties are willing to undertake the risk, the notes
can be made payable for a longer period of time. In one instance, payment over a
seventeen-year period was approved in a private ruling. ABA BULL. OF THE SECTION
OF TAXATION 134 (Fall 1967). After the date of that ruling, however, the Service an-
nounced that ordinarily it will not rule on the tax effect of a redemption when pay-
ment is made in corporate notes payable over more than fifteen years. Rev. Proc. 69-6,
§ 4.01-3, 1969 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 1, at 31.
174. See note 14 supra.
175. Section 302(c)(2) provides that in certain dearly defined circumstances, § 318,
under which stock owned by one member of a family is attributed to another family
member (see note 14 supra), is inapplicable.
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for the interest that the notes will bear. 7 6 More important, they
should provide for any security which might be desired. Adequate
security may not only help to prevent characterization of the notes
as an equity interest, but will often be particularly useful for a
shareholder who wants to minimize any financial risk to which his
survivors would be subject if they hold the corporation's notes.
Of course, in some situations, the net asset value of the corporation
may be of such magnitude as to render that risk inconsequential,
or the risk may have to be undertaken because no other means of
payment is feasible. But if security is to be provided, it is prefer-
able for the corporation to secure the notes with assets other than
the redeemed stock, since a pledge of the redeemed stock may pre-
vent the transfer of the corporation's notes from qualifying as a
payment;177 the transaction may not be deemed closed when the
stock is surrendered because there is a possibility that the share-
holder will reacquire it on default. Whether or not that conten-
tion is sound, the Service's refusal to rule on the question promotes
the avoidance of such an arrangement. If the transaction is not
deemed closed when the note is issued, payments made after the
statutory period will not come within section 303, and the share-
holder's interest in the pledged stock may render inoperative the
section 302(b) exclusions from dividend treatment on redemption.
Moreover, a pledge of the redeemed stock is not a particularly valu-
able security device. If the corporation is unable to pay its debts,
its stock is not likely to be of greater value than the defaulted notes.
Finally, if the pledge of the stock constitutes a secured transaction
within the coverage of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the secured party might be required to hold a public sale of the
stock in order to foreclose on his lien. Such a public offering would
force him to comply with federal and state security regulations, and
that is a costly procedure. 78
176. Interest will be imputed at a 5% rate [INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 483; Treas.
Reg. § 1.483-1(c)(2) (1966)], if the notes of the corporation do not bear interest of at
least 4%. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(d)(2) (1966). While a redemption does not constitute an
actual sale or exchange, § 483 applies to transactions that are "treated as a sale or ex-
change for purposes of the Code." Treas. Reg. § 1A83-1(b)(1) (1966). If the note is
payable within one year after redemption, however, § 483 is not applicable [INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 483(c)(1)(B)], but few notes will be payable in such a brief period.
177. Rev. Proc. 69-6, § 3.01-5, 1969 INT. Rev. BuLL. No. 1, at 29, states that the Ser-
vice will not rule on whether § 302(b) applies to a redemption plan under which the
redeemed stock is held as security or in escrow for the payment of corporate notes, and
under which there is a possibility that the stock may be returned to the shareholder
on default. For a discussion of this issue, see Sexton, Providing Security for the Out-
going Stockholder and Avoiding Tax Disadvantages to Selling and Remaining Stock-
holders, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FE. TAx. 555 (1966).
178. See Mitchell, Corporate Buy-Sell Agreements and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 46 Micit. ST. B.J. 12 (May 1967).
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Another means of safeguarding the interests of those who in-
herit from a deceased shareholder is to have the corporation's notes
personally guaranteed by the surviving shareholders. If this is done,
the corporation's subsequent payments on the notes, even though
they reduce the potential secondary liability of the surviving share-
holders, will normally not constitute constructive income to them
because the corporation is the primary obligor, and because the
shareholders are merely incidental beneficiaries of the corporation's
satisfaction of its debt.1 7 9 If, however, the corporation's capacity to
satisfy the obligations is extremely doubtful, its liability may be
deemed a sham, and the payments made by the corporation may
constitute dividend income to the shareholder-guarantors.
If the various objections to the use of corporate notes are out-
weighed by their desirability, then attention must be paid to the
various financial and equitable limitations on a corporation's re-
demption of its own stock. 80 In particular, there is considerable
question as to when the corporation must satisfy the applicable
financial requirements-when it distributes its promissory note,
when it makes payments on the note, or at both times.181 According
to one view, the financial limitations are applicable only when the
corporation makes payments on its note and only to the extent of
such payments, since the mere transfer of a corporate note does not
prejudice the corporation's creditors or other stockholders.18 2 Under
that approach, the transferee of the note must accept the risk that
financial restrictions might prohibit the corporation from making
payments on it. Another view would treat the transaction as closed
when the note is given.'8 Thus, unless the issue is settled in the
controlling jurisdiction, the planner should attempt to provide for
the corporation's compliance with the financial requisites at all rele-
vant dates.
C. Corporate Law Considerations
The corporate laws dealing with the transfer and redemption of
stock differ from state to state. Several of the underlying considera-
tions which are uniformly applicable are discussed below, but the
179. See Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967); Prin-
cess Coals, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 401, 411-12 (S.D. W. Va. 1965); Arthur
J. Kobacker, 87 T.C. 882, 895 (1952), acq., 1964-2 Cunr. BULL. 6; Rev. Rul. 59-286,
1959-2 CGu. BULL. 103.
180. See text accompanying notes 203-08 infra.
181. See ABA BULL. OF THE SEcTION OF TAXATION 134 (Fall 1967).
182. See, e.g., Mountain State Steel Foundaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737
(4th Cir. 1960).
183. See ABA BULL. OF THE SEcTION OF TAXATION 134 (Fall 1967).
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preparation of a specific entity buy-out plan must include a careful
examination of the corporate laws of the appropriate jurisdiction.
A major purpose of a mandatory buy-out is to prevent a dece-
dent's stock from falling into the hands of persons who will disrupt
managerial harmony. 84 For that reason, when a mandatory buy-out
is arranged, the agreement should impose restrictions on a share-
holder's transfer of his stock during his life. 8 5 Moreover, a buy-out
agreement will not establish the value of the decedent's stock for
estate tax purposes unless there are adequate restrictions on the
shareholder's right to sell the stock during his life."", The most pop-
ular restriction on lifetime transfers is a provision granting the cor-
poration the right of first refusal.
The extent to which restrictions can be imposed upon the trans-
fer of stock depends upon local law. Generally, an absolute restraint
on alienation, unlimited in time, is invalid; 18 T but reasonable re-
straints on transfers are permissible. 8 A right of first refusal usually
constitutes a reasonable restraint. 8 9 In addition, mandatory stock
purchase agreements to be implemented on death are likely to be
valid in all jurisdictions. 90 Although a 1928 New York Court of
Appeals decision-Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Incorporated v.
Schwartz' 91 -held a stock purchase agreement invalid as lacking
mutuality because the corporation might not have sufficient surplus
to make the purchase when the time came to acquire the stock, that
decision has no continuing vitality. It is highly unlikely under pres-
ent law that a court, in New York or in any other jurisdiction, would
hold a stock redemption agreement invalid for the reason given in
184. A mandatory buy-out agreement constitutes a restraint on transfer after the
death of the shareholder.
185. These restrictions may take many forms, such as an absolute prohibition against
any transfer, a requirement of obtaining the prior consent of other shareholders or
directors or a percentage of them, or a "first-option" provision granting the corpora-
tion or its directors or shareholders a right of first refusal to purchase stock that a
shareholder wishes to sell. 2 F. O'NEL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.05 (1958) provides a
list of the types of restrictions that have been imposed.
186. See note 10 supra.
187. O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Plan-
ning and Drafting, 65 HARv. L. REy. 773, 777-78 (1952).
188. H. BALLANTINE, COROATIONS § 336 (1946 ed.); 12 W. FLEtCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATAIONS § 5453 (penn. ed. rev. repl. 1957).
189. 2 F. O'NAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.09 (1958).
190. Id. § 7.10. Of course, if the provisions of the agreement are too severe, such as
when the buy-out price is extremely low, there is a risk that the agreement will be
invalid [Green v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938)], but
otherwise there is little danger of invalidity. This is an additional reason for establish-
ing a reasonable price for the stock.
191. 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928).
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Schwartz.192 Indeed, the remote possibility that Schwartz might have
a continuing influence on New York corporate law was terminated
by statutory enactment.193
The validity of restrictions on stock transfers depends in part
upon the means by which they are imposed. Such restrictions should
be included both in the articles of incorporation and in a separate
contractual agreement between the corporation and the share-
holders.19 4 As an alternative in some states, the relevant restriction
could be included in the bylaws. 195 Furthermore, under both the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform Commercial Code,
the restrictions must be stated on the face of the share certificates.",
A restriction against all inter vivos transfers would prevent the
shareholders from donating part of their stock holdings to members
of their family for estate planning purposes. It may therefore be
desirable to exempt gifts to a limited class of close family members,
provided that the same transfer restriction is made applicable to any
donee, and that the transferred stock is subject to a mandatory re-
demption at the donor's death.' 97
Self-imposed restrictions, however, are not the only limitations
on the transfer of shares pertinent to a buy-out arrangement. State
laws in some jurisdictions once prohibited a corporation from pur-
chasing its own shares, and, indeed, such a prohibition still exists in
192. 2 F. O'NAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.10 (1958). See Greater N.Y. Carpet
House, Inc. v. I-erschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1940) (enforcing a
stock purchase agreement and distinguishing Schwartz on the ground that the corpora-
tion's purchase of life insurance policies to fund the agreement constituted sufficient
consideration). The Schwartz decision has been expressly repudiated by several courts.
E.g., Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 313-14, 34 Cal. Rptr.
317, 324 (1963).
193. § 514(b) N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAv (McKinney 1963) (adopted 1961, effective Sept.
1, 1963).
194. 12 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5453
(perm. ed. rev. repl. 1957). 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.14 (1958), provides an
excellent discussion of the advantages of including the restrictive provision in both
the charter and a shareholder agreement.
195. The placing of a restrictive provision in the bylaws is sufficient in some states.
[2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.707 (1958)], but it is safer to use the articles of
incorporation.
196. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 15; UNIFORM CO-IFERCI. CODE § 8-204. See
2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.16 (1958), for a discussion of the amount of in-
formation about the restriction which must be noted on the certificate. Some states
require quite detailed information. In Michigan, for example, the restrictions imposed
on all classes of stock must be stated on each share certificate, irrespective of which
class of stock it represents. 2 F. O'NEAL, supra, at 26 n.78.
197. This exemption should not affect the estate tax valuation of the stock since
neither the shareholder nor the donee can dispose of the stock for a greater price than
that which is payable on the shareholder's death. Cf. Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d
Cir. 1936).
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England.198 Fortunately, such restrictions are largely a matter of
historical interest in this country, for almost all American jurisdic-
tions have rejected the English rule.199 Most states, including some
whose courts had once accepted that rule, have adopted statutes
expressly permitting a corporation to purchase its own shares.200 A
leading commentator on corporate law states that probably no juris-
diction in America would hold that a corporation lacked the power
per se to purchase its own stock.201 Nevertheless, it may still be
prudent to include in the corporation's charter a specific grant of
that power. In at least one state, California, the parties may be re-
quired to obtain a permit from the appropriate state official to enter
into an effective redemption or buy-sell agreement and to transfer
shares of stock of certain closely held corporations.20 2 This is an
extraordinary requirement, however, and when such permits are re-
quired, they are not difficult to acquire.
But even though a corporation will normally have the power to
purchase its own shares, that power is not completely unharnessed.
Every state imposes restrictions on the exercise of the power, and
care must always be taken to observe whatever restrictions are
applicable in the relevant jurisdiction. Equitable limitations, for
example, bar a corporation from acquiring its own shares if there
is a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty,
or similar misconduct.20 3 Such restrictions, however, will not con-
stitute a significant problem when the buy-out agreement is made in
good faith.
The financial limitations on stock purchases are of greater sig-
nificance. These requirements, designed to protect both creditors
and the other shareholders, can be divided into three broad cate-
198. Levy, Purchase by an English Company of Its Own Shares, 79 U. PA. L. Rv.
45 (1930), discusses the English rule in depth. See also 6A W. FLTrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2846 (penn. ed. rev. repl. 1968).
199. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 256(a) (1946); 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2847-48 (penn. ed. rev. repl. 1968).
200. Id. See, e.g., MICH. CO,,aP. LAws § 450.10(h) (1948). The statutory citations for
each state are set forth in 7 Z. CAViTCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 147.03, at 811 n.3
(1968).
201. Z. CAviTCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 147.03 (1968). A few specific types of
corporations are prohibited from acquiring their own shares. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 83
(1964) (restrictions imposed on national banks).
202. Walker, Life Insurance from the Standpoint of the Federal Corporate and
Personal Income Tax, Gift Tax, and Estate Tax, U. So. CAL. 1966 TAx INSTITUTE 543,
548-51.
203. 7 Z. CAvrrcH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 147.04(2) (1968). In addition, federal
securities laws may impose similar restrictions. See Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its
Own Shares-Are There New Overtones?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 620 (1965).
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gories.204 (1) Surplus requirements. Shares must usually be pur-
chased from surplus, which is defined for these purposes in various
ways-as earned surplus, as capital surplus plus earned surplus, or
simply as any surplus--depending upon state law. A number of
states prohibit the impairment of capital, a provision which is
essentially the same as requiring that the purchase be made from any
surplus. Some state laws permit the use of capital surplus only if
a requisite number of shareholders approve, or if the articles permit
it. Virtually all of the states, however, have some form of surplus
requirement. (2) Solvency. The corporation is often prohibited from
purchasing its own shares if it is insolvent or if the purchase would
result in its insolvency.20 5 (3) Preferential rights. Sometimes there
are statutory provisions requiring that after a purchase, net assets
must exceed the value of any preferential right of shareholders on
liquidation; such provisions, however, have not been widely adopted.
The financial limitations imposed by a given jurisdiction may de-
mand compliance with only one of the above tests or, more typically,
with a combination of them.
The word "redemption" or "redeem" has been used heretofore
in this Article in the tax sense, that is, to refer to a corporation's
acquisition of its own stock in exchange for property.206 For corpo-
rate law purposes, however, the term "redemption" has a distinctive
meaning; it is a corporation's purchase "of its own shares exercised
pursuant to pre-existing redemption provisions in the articles or
certificate of incorporation." 20 7 Thus, the difference between re-
deemable stock and ordinary stock subject to a mandatory entity
purchase agreement rests on a subtle distinction; nevertheless, the
financial restrictions imposed on stock redemptions are less stringent
than those imposed on stock purchases. 20 8 Generally, redeemable
204. 7 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINES ORGANIZATIONS § 147.04(1) (1968).
205. "Insolvent" in the bankruptcy sense means that the corporation's liabilities
exceed its assets. Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1964). This test adds little
to a surplus test. Some statutes, however, have adopted the equity test of insolvency,
that is, the corporation is insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts when they become
due in the normal course of business. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1708 (West 1955). Some
states employ both the bankruptcy and the equity test of insolvency. E.g., MD. ANN.
CODE art. 23, § 32(c) (1966).
206. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 317(b).
207. 7 Z. CAvrrCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 147.05(2) (1968).
208. Id. § 147.05(l). The same equitable limitations that are applicable to stock
purchases apply to redemptions, but the financial limitations are liberalized. For
example, the corporation may be permitted to use the stated capital of the redeemed
stock for its redemption. In addition, some states grant other special exceptions to the
requirement that purchases be made out of surplus-for example, in the situation in
which the corporation eliminates fractional shares or pays dissenting shareholders the
appraised value of their shares. Id. § 147.04(1)(a). Those special exceptions, however,
have little significance to buy-out plans.
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stock differs from stock subject to an entity purchase agreement in
that the purchase provisions for redeemable stock are an attribute
of the stock itself whereas the purchase provisions of nonredeem-
able stock are the product of contractual agreements. Moreover,
redeemable stock is usually preferred stock.
Since there is a risk, then, that financial limitations will prohibit
a corporation from purchasing a decedent's stock on the latter's
death, any stock purchase agreement should obligate the surviving
shareholders to use all available surplus to purchase the stock, and
the corporation and the shareholders should agree to take all neces-
sary steps-perhaps short of capital contributions-to provide the
corporation with sufficient surplus to make that purchase. In juris-
dictions in which local law permits the corporation to use capital
surplus only if the articles of incorporation explicitly authorize it
to do so, the articles should so provide. If the corporation has
appreciated assets, it is possible in some jurisdictions to "write up"
the appreciation on the corporation's books and thereby to create
an appraisal surplus. The agreement should also require that if the
corporation does not purchase the deceased shareholder's stock after
a given period of time, then the surviving shareholders shall either
make the payments on behalf of the corporation as its guarantors,2 9
or purchase the stock on their own behalf. In some circumstances, it
may be possible, by taking advantage of the more liberal provisions
for purchasing redeemable stock, to recapitalize the corporation so
that the deceased shareholder's stock is exchanged for redeemable
preferred stock. Such a plan, however, creates great risks because it
is uncertain whether a recapitalization after the decedent's death
will be effective for this purpose,2 1 and because the preferred stock
received after decedent's death is likely to be characterized as section
306 stock.21'
IV. CROSS-PURCHASE PLANS
Although the entity purchase is the most popular form of buy-
out, it is not always the best. Sometimes a cross-purchase plan, in
which the surviving shareholders purchase the interest of a deceased
209. The secondary liability of the surviving shareholders will not cause payments
made by the corporation as primary obligor to be treated as dividends to them. See
note 179 supra and accompanying text.
210. The success of this arrangement may depend upon whether or not all of the
shareholders either consent to the recapitalization or had consented to it in a prior
shareholder's agreement.
211. See note 29 supra. If the redemption qualifies under § 303 of the Code, it will
not matter that the redeemed shares were "section 306" stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.303-2(d)
(1955).
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shareholder, will be more advantageous, since it eliminates a num-
ber of the risks which attend the entity purchase.
A. Advantages of the Cross-Purchase Plan
When the stock of a corporation is held by several family groups,
the cross-purchase arrangement is a useful way to provide for the
purchase of a decedent's stock without disturbing the balance of
power over the control of the corporation. An illustration may be
helpful:
IV-A-1. The X Corporation has one hundred shares of common
stock outstanding; thirty shares are owned by Joseph Smith, thirty
shares by Joseph's brother, Robert Smith, twenty shares by Paul
Rand and twenty shares by Paul's sister, Rose Rand. The Smiths
want a buy-out agreement for their stock, but if the stock of either
Smith brother were redeemed by the corporation pursuant to an
entity purchase plan, control of the corporation would pass to the
Rand family who would then possess over 57% of the corporation's
common stock. The Smiths could execute a cross-purchase agree-
ment between themselves so that on the death of one Smith, his
brother would purchase his stock, thus retaining control of X in the
Smith family.
The dilemma of the Smith family, however, might also be re-
solved by means that permit the use of an entity purchase plan. For
example, the X Corporation could be recapitalized so that its out-
standing common stock would be exchanged for common and pre-
ferred stock.21 2 The corporation could then execute a buy-out agree-
ment to purchase the preferred stock of a shareholder upon his
demise. Since only preferred stock could be redeemed under the
agreement, there would be no shift of control; and if the preferred
stock were owned by the decedent at the time of his death, it would
not constitute section 306 stock.213 Of course, a corollary to that
advantage is that if the decedent's estate or legatee received pre-
ferred stock as a stock dividend or pursuant to a recapitalization
after the decedent's death, the sale of that preferred stock may well
212. A recapitalization of this nature will usually cause no recognition of income
to the shareholders. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 354(a), 368(a)(1)(E). Alternatively, the
X Corporation could simply distribute preferred stock to its shareholders as a tax-free
stock dividend. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 305.
213. Since the basis of stock included in a decedent's gross estate will not be a
substituted or transferred basis (§ 1014), preferred stock so held by a decedent at his
death does not fall within the definition of "section 306" stock. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 306(c). See note 29 supra. Even if the recapitalization of X were effected after the
decedent's demise, the decedent's preferred stock could be redeemed without adverse
consequences under § 306 to the extent that the amount received for the stock is within
the protection of § 303. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 303(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.303-2(d) (1955);
see note 15 supra.
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be tainted by section 306 and consequently may cause the recogni-
tion of ordinary income on the sale. An additional problem is that
the amount distributed by X in redemption of the decedent's pre-
ferred stock might be treated as essentially equivalent to a dividend,
and consequently taxed as ordinary income, unless the distribution
were protected by section 303 or unless the redemption were
deemed, under section 302(b)(1) or possibly under section 346,214 to
be not essentially equivalent to dividend. While there is some sup-
port for the exclusion of such a redemption from dividend treatment
under section 302(b)(1),215 the uncertainty as to the applicability of
that exception might well deter the parties from adopting a plan
of this nature unless they are reasonably certain that the mechan-
ical, and therefore more readily ascertainable, requisites for pro-
tection under section 303 will be satisfied. Moreover, even if the
potential dividend problem could be resolved, the Rands might
refuse to permit a recapitalization of X or the execution of an entity
purchase agreement. In that event, a cross-purchase plan would be
the only viable alternative. Thus, while the cross-purchase plan is
usually not the only possible means for effecting a mandatory pur-
chase at death without disrupting the lines of corporate control, it
is a useful device for that purpose, and at times it is the only avail-
able means. Another possible method for maintaining control, and
one that will be the most desirable in some circumstances, is to com-
bine an entity purchase plan for part of a decedent's stock with a
cross-purchase plan to acquire the remainder of it.
Since a corporation's accumulation of earnings as a reserve for
redemption of stock increases the net asset value of the corporation,
it causes the book value of the corporatiori's stock to rise. Thus, if
a deceased shareholder's estate is to receive the actual value of its
stock, accumulating funds for an entity purchase drives the redemp-
tion price of the stock upwards. This spiralling effect does not occur
in a cross-purchase arrangement. The use of a cross-purchase plan
also avoids some of the tax problems that attend an entity purchase;
the risk that an accumulated earnings tax will be imposed, for ex-
ample, does not arise, nor does the risk that payments in redemption
of stock will be characterized as dividend income. Nevertheless, as
noted below, the cross-purchase plan does create other tax problems
which may be equally serious in some cases.216
A further advantage to a cross-purchase is that the surviving
214. See notes 17, 53 supra.
215. See Commissioner v. Estate of Antrim, 395 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1968), affg. 36
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 67,060 (1967).
216. See note 29 supra and text accompanying notes 231-33 infra.
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shareholders will acquire a basis in the decedent's stock equal to
the purchase price. The significance of obtaining that basis depends
upon whether or not they subsequently sell the stock, cause the com-
plete or partial liquidation of the corporation, or receive distribu-
tions from the corporation in excess of its earnings and profits. The
acquisition of a useful basis for the purchased stock is a small advan-
tage, but one which could be meaningful.
Frequently, the surviving shareholders will purchase the dece-
dent's stock with funds obtained from the corporation or from the
proceeds of insurance whose premiums were paid with corporate
funds. In either case, the net cost of the cross-purchase is usually
higher than that of the entity purchase plan.2 17 The sole exception
is the situation in which the shareholders are in a lower income tax
bracket than the corporation and the needed funds can be with-
drawn from the corporation in some tax deductible form, such as
rent or salary, over a period of years. This withdrawal must be
spread over a number of years because the tax imposed on the distri-
bution of a large sum in one year is usually greater than the tax
payable by the corporation, and in that event making the distribu-
tion deductible will not suffice to render the cross-purchase less ex-
pensive. In addition, the shareholders must face financial and
equitable limitations imposed by state corporate law on the corpo-
ration's power to make distributions to shareholders, in their capac-
ity as shareholders, when it is impossible to withdraw the needed
funds as a business expense of the corporation. In the rare instance
in which these hurdles can be overcome, a cross-purchase will be less
expensive than an entity purchase, but in the more typical situation,
a comparison of net costs will not favor the cross-purchase plan.
Thus, the primary advantages of a cross-purchase are the ease
with which control can be retained in one group and the avoidance
of certain tax risks. If these advantages should lead to the choice
of such a buy-out arrangement, the mechanics of the agreement are
the next consideration. Many of these mechanics are identical to
those of entity purchase plans, but some-particularly those involved
with funding-pose particular difficulties.
B. Similarities to the Entity Purchase
As with the entity purchase, one of the first steps in preparing
a cross-purchase is the determination of the price. The various
means available for establishing the price do not change with the
217. See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
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type of agreement.218 Similarly, it is desirable to impose restrictions
on the inter vivos transfer of shares, regardless of the identity of the
purchaser; unless there are restrictions on the shareholders' transfer
of stock, the buy-out agreement will not prevent a third party from
purchasing a shareholder's stock before his death and will not estab-
lish the estate tax value of the stock. The considerations applicable
to the restriction of the transfer of stock subject to an entity pur-
chase agreement 19 are equally applicable to stock subject to a cross-
purchase plan. Consequently, restrictions on stock transfers should
be included in the corporation's charter as well as in the share-
holder's agreement, and such restrictions should be noted on the
face of the stock certificates. 20
Another area of similarity between the two types of buy-outs is
the effect of the buy-out on the decedent's estate. A planner should
take precautions to ensure that a cross-purchase establishes the estate
tax value of the decedent's shares. To do this, the agreement must
be a bona fide, arm's-length bargain, the price must be reasonable,
the decedent's estate must be obligated to sell, and the decedent
must not be permitted to sell during his life for a price greater than
that established in the agreement.22'
The proceeds of a life insurance policy will not be included in
the insured's gross estate for estate tax purposes unless the insured
died possessing incidents of ownership in the policy22 or unless the
policy proceeds were payable to the insured's executor.23 If, how-
ever, the proceeds are included in the decedent's estate, but distri-
bution of those proceeds is conditioned on the surrender of the in-
sured's stock in the corporation, the estate tax value of that stock
will be reduced by an amount equal to the insurance proceeds.224 In
the interests of caution, then, the insured should usually avoid
possessing incidents of ownership in an insurance policy held by
a fellow shareholder to fund a purchase agreement.
If the stock is included in the decedent's gross estate for estate
tax purposes, the estate should not suffer adverse income tax conse-
218. For a discussion of those means, see text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
219. See notes 184-97 supra and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion of the requirements for imposing effective restrictions on stock
transfers, see notes 194-97 supra and accompanying text.
221. See notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
222. The term "incidents of ownership" is defined in Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2)
(1958).
223. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 2042(1).
224. See, e.g., Estate of John T.H. Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938), acq., 1938-1 Cums.
BULL. 20. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
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quences from the sale of that stock. Under section 1014 of the Code,
the estate's basis in the stock is equal to its fair market value at the
date of the decedent's death; and since executors usually sell the
stock for a price equal to its value at the date of death,225 there is
generally no gain or loss. Moreover, if the stock is included in the
decedent's gross estate, and if there is no reorganization or stock
dividend after his death, section 306 will not create difficulties.22 6
C. Funding
1. Life Insurance Funding
Life insurance is commonly used to fund cross-purchase agree-
ments, and often the premiums for the insurance are derived from
corporate distributions to the shareholders. If this means of funding
is used, every shareholder will purchase insurance on the life of each
of the other shareholders. The premiums paid on such policies,
however, are usually not deductible as business expenditures;' 27 even
if the insurance premiums are deemed incidental to the share-
holder's business, they will still not be deductible expenses.2 8
Another disadvantage of cross-purchase plans which are funded
with life insurance is that the complexity of having multiple insur-
ance policies held by the shareholders can become burdensome
when the corporation has more than two shareholders. An example
may be useful:
IV-C-1. The X Corporation has three equal shareholders, A, B, and
C. The agreed net worth of X is $300,000. The three shareholders
execute a cross-purchase agreement under which the surviving two
shareholders will purchase the stock of the first to die for $100,000,
and the last surviving shareholder will purchase the stock of the
second to die for $150,000. Accordingly, A purchases two $50,000
life insurance policies, one on the life of B and one on C; B pur-
chases $50,000 insurance on the lives of both A and C; and C pur-
chases $50,000 life insurance on the lives of both A and B. The plan
225. Of course, if the alternate valuation date is elected (INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 2032), that date controls. In any event, when the buy-sell agreement establishes the
estate tax value of the stock, the stock's basis will be identical to the amount of the
purchase price.
226. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(c)(1); see note 29 supra.
227. If it is not a business expense, no deduction is allowed. INT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 262.
228. Section 264 of the Code denies an income tax deduction for premiums paid to
insure the life of a person financially interested in any of the taxpayer's trades or
businesses if the taxpayer is directly or indirectly a beneficiary of the policy. See also
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 265.
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requires the purchase of six policies; if there had been four share-
holders, they would have needed twelve policies. 229
The difficulties of A, B, and C have just begun. When one of the
shareholders dies, the buy-out arrangement between the two sur-
vivors creates additional problems:
IV-C-2. Continuing the facts of example IV-C-l, A dies and B and
C each collects $50,000 insurance proceeds which they use to pur-
chase A's stock. The insurance proceeds received by B and C are
not included in their gross income for income tax purposes. 23 0 After
purchasing A's stock, B and C each has an obligation to pay
$150,000 for the other's stock if the other dies next. However, B
has only $50,000 insurance on C's life, and vice versa. B and C could
increase their insurance funding by purchasing new policies, but it
would be less expensive to acquire an existing policy. Consequently,
B will want to purchase from A's estate the policy A owned on C's
life, and C would like to purchase the policy A held on B's life. That
will still leave B and C $50,000 short in their funding, and they will
also face a serious problem in the transfer-for-value rule.2 31 When
B dies, and C collects $100,000 insurance proceeds, C is not taxed on
the $50,000 proceeds from the policy he originally acquired from the
insurer. But under the transfer-for-value rule, C is taxed on the
proceeds from the insurance policy he purchased from A's estate to
the extent that those proceeds exceed the consideration paid by C
plus the premiums subsequently paid by him.n23
One method of avoiding a multiplicity of policies and, perhaps,
the transfer-for-value rule is to utilize a trust arrangement for the
cross-purchase plan:
IV-C-3. Returning to the facts of example IV-C-l, the three share-
holders establish a trust and the trust acquires a $100,000 life in-
surance policy on the life of each shareholder. On the death of A,
the trustee collects the proceeds and purchases A's stock. Thus, only
three insurance policies are needed instead of six. When B subse-
229. A trust arrangement may be used to avoid this plethora of policies. See text
following note 232 infra.
250. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 101(a)(l).
231. When an insurance policy is transferred to a party for valuable consideration,
the exemption from income tax provided for insurance proceeds under § 101 is not
applicable [§ 101(a)(2)], since the recipient of the proceeds may exclude from his income
only that portion of the amount of proceeds which is equal to the consideration paid
by the transferee plus the' premiums paid subsequent to the transfer. Certain classes
of persons, however, are exempted from the transfer-for-value rule; for example, a
transfer for value to a partner of the insured or to a corporation in which the insured
is a shareholder or officer does not cause the insurance proceeds to be included in the
transferee's gross income. INT. Rxv. CODE Of 1954, § 101(a)(2)(B). But there is no ex-
ception for transfers to a fellow shareholder of a corporation in which the insured
holds stock.
232. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 101(a)(2).
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quently dies, there is a possibility that the transfer-for-value rule will
cause the proceeds of B's insurance to be taxed in part;233 but the
applicability of that rule to trust arrangements is unsettled. Of
course, even this method provides only $100,000 insurance for the
$150,000 obligation of the two surviving shareholders.
At this juncture, the fundamental financial soundness of life in-
surance funding for cross-purchase plans should be called into
question.
IV-C-4. A and B are equal shareholders of the X Corporation which
has a net worth of $100,000. A and B execute a cross-purchase agree-
ment establishing the price of each other's stock at $50,000. A pur-
chases a $50,000 life insurance policy on B's life, and B reciprocates.
A and B are the same age and the premiums for their policies are
identical. Each of them pays premiums of $1,600 per year for the
policy he holds on the other's life. After three years (and three
premium payments) A dies and B collects the $50,000 insurance and
purchases A's stock with the proceeds. The cash surrender value of
B's policy at the time of A's death is $500.
The most significant aspect of this example is that, in substance, A
received only 500 dollars for his 50,000 dollar interest in the X Cor-
poration. If the parties had not executed a buy-out agreement, A
could have used the money he paid for premiums on B's life to pur-
chase a 50,000 dollar insurance policy on his own life, and upon his
death his estate would then have had the 50,000 dollars insurance
proceeds plus a one-half interest in the corporation. Under the buy-
out plan, A's estate did receive 50,000 dollars from B, but the in-
surance policy which the estate retained was on B's life, and had a
cash value of only 500 dollars at A's death. In effect, then, A ex-
changed his share of the business for the 500 dollar value of the
policy on B's life.
If the ages of the shareholders differ significantly, the problem
is ameliorated, because the older shareholder will pay a smaller
premium for insurance on the younger man's life than he would pay
for insurance on his own life, and because the converse will be true
for the younger man. Since it is probable that the younger man will
survive and reap the rewards of the buy-out arrangement, it is fair
to impose the greater burden on him. In such a situation, insurance
funding of a cross-purchase is not as inequitable as it is when the
233. Professor Polasky points out that upon the death of A there was a shifting of
the equitable interests of B and C in the policy insuring B's life, and that this shift
may constitute a transfer of an interest in the policy. Polasky suggests that since the
transfer of equitable interests is made for mutual consideration, it may trigger the
transfer-for-value rule. See Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest
in a Closely Held Business (pt. III), 46 IowA L. REv. 516, 526 n.38 (1961).
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shareholders' ages are close, but the arrangement still favors the
survivor to a considerable extent.=4 Thus, in most cases, insurance
funding of cross-purchase agreements greatly favors the survivors,
and the parties should be informed of that fact before they enter
into such agreements.
On the other hand, if the parties do not wish to provide a de-
ceased shareholder with a significant sum of money for his stock,
there can be tax advantages to the use of a cross-purchase arrange-
ment funded by life insurance. If, instead of that arrangement, A
and B simply agree that when either dies, that person's estate will
receive only 500 dollars for his stock, and if each party acquires
his own insurance protection, the insurance proceeds will be in-
cluded in the deceased shareholder's gross estate; and the corpo-
rate stock will be included at a valuation that may be far in excess
of the 500 dollar payment.235 Thus, if the decedent had purchased
a 50,000 dollar life insurance policy, the 50,000 dollar insurance
proceeds plus the 50,000 dollar value of the decedent's stock will
be included in the decedent's gross estate. 236 If, however, a cross-
purchase buy-out arrangement is employed, only the 50,000 dollar
value of the decedent's stock plus the 500 dollar value of the sur-
vivor's policy will be included, resulting in a reduction of 49,500
dollars in the decedent's gross estate.
When life insurance is used as a means of funding a cross-pur-
chase plan, the parties should also consider the benefits of the several
settlement options available under the policy. The considerations
in using such options in a cross-purchase plan are essentially the
same as those discussed above for the entity purchase. 37
Some commentators 238 have suggested that a cross-purchase ar-
rangement might be employed in conjunction with split-dollar insur-
ance in order to minimize the costs of the plan. Such an arrangement,
234. But see Abrams, Tax Planning for Agreements Disposing of a Shareholder's
Closely Held Stock at Death, 57 GEo. L.J. 1211, 1215-16 (1969) (contending that the im-
position of a greater premium burden on the younger shareholder, who often lacks
liquidity, is unfair; and that this imbalance is magnified when the older shareholder
possesses more stock than the younger so that a greater principal amount of insurance
is required to fund the purchase of the older man's stock).
235. A $500 purchase price for the decedent's stock might not be regarded a bona
fide price, and in that case it would not fix the estate tax value of the decedent's stock.
236. A shareholder might remove the insurance proceeds from his estate by assigning
it during his life to a beneficiary or to an insurance trust. But the advantages and
pitfalls of assigning insurance and employing an insurance trust are beyond the scope
of this Article.
237. See pt. III.B.2.b. supra.
238. See, e.g., Note, Estate Planning for the Disposition of a Family Corporation, 52
MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1030 nA6 (1968).
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however, is not recommended. Split-dollar insurance is a tech-
nique by which an employer may provide life insurance benefits
for its employees at a minimum tax cost to them. Under a split-
dollar arrangement, an ordinary life insurance policy is issued on
the life of an employee. The employer provides the funds for that
part of the premium that is equal to the increase in the policy's cash
surrender value for the year of the payment, and the employee
.provides the funds for the balance of the premium. Upon the em-
ployee's demise, or upon a surrender of the insurance policy, that
amount of the policy's proceeds which is equal to the total funds
provided by the employer will be paid to the employer, and the
remainder of the proceeds are payable to the beneficiary named by
the employee. Thus, in the initial years of the policy, when there is
little or no cash surrender value, virtually all of the premiums are
paid by the employee. As the policy's cash value builds, the amount
of the annual premium payable by the employee is reduced; and
after a number of years, the employee may not be required to make
any payment at all. On the other hand, since the amount provided
by the employer is a charge against the proceeds of the policy, each
additional contribution of the employer diminishes the amount of
proceeds payable to the employee's beneficiary; consequently, the
effect of the plan to the employee is essentially the same as providing
him with declining term life insurance-the employee has no equity
in the policy and his insurance coverage is reduced each year.
In 1964, the Commissioner revoked an earlier ruling- 09 which
had determined that a split-dollar arrangement did not cause the
employee to recognize gross income. In his new ruling,240 the Com-
missioner determined that the employee recognizes gross income
each year to the extent that the value of the insurance provided him
for that year-the cost of term insurance coverage241-exceeds the
amount of premium paid by the employee for such year.
Under a split-dollar arrangement, the employee will not recog-
nize any taxable income in the initial years of the policy, but he will
recognize an increasingly greater amount of income in each subse-
239. Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 23.
240. Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 11.
241. The value of the insurance provided the employee is usually ascertained by
determining the cost per S1,000 of term insurance, as established in tables promulgated
in the Service's rulings. Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 228; Rev. Rul. 66-110,
1966-1 Cum. BULL. 12. If, however, the employee's insurer has published rates for term
insurance which are lower than the rates set forth in the Service's rulings, and if the
insurer's lower published rates are available to all standard risk applicants, then the
insurance cost may be determined by using the insurer's rates. Rev. Rul. 66-110, 1966-1
Cum. BULL. 12; Rev. Rul. 67-154, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 11.
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quent year, whether the policy is held by the employer or by the em-
ployee.242 Moreover, even though the employee must recognize
income, the Commissioner maintains that the employer is not per-
mitted any tax deduction for its payment of premiums because it
is a direct or indirect beneficiary of the policy within the meaning
of section 264 of the Code, which bars deductions in such cases. 243
If split-dollar insurance is employed to fund a cross-purchase
plan, the arrangement will be similar to the following example:
IV-C-5. The X Corporation, which has a net worth of $100,000, has
two equal shareholders, A and B, both of whom are also employed
by X. A and B execute a cross-purchase agreement for the mandatory
purchase of the stock of whoever dies first. The purchase price of
$50,000 is to be funded by life insurance, the premiums for which
will be paid under a split-dollar plan. Thus, the X Corporation will
take out a policy insuring A's life for $50,000; X will pay the
premiums for the policy up to its cash surrender value, and B will
pay the balance of the premiums. Upon A's death, the proceeds of
the policy, less its cash value which is payable to X, will be paid to
A's estate on behalf of B as part or all of the purchase price payable
by B on account of the buy-out agreement. X will provide a recipro-
cal arrangement for B, and A will share in the premium payments
for the policy on B's life.
This arrangement, however, has many drawbacks and should not
be employed. Referring to example IV-C-5, the amount of insurance
coverage under a split-dollar plan declines each year as the cash
value increases, and consequently, A and B will have to establish
an additional reserve fund to supplement their declining insurance
coverage. Moreover, A and B will recognize an increasing amount
of gross income each year, and yet the Service apparently will not
allow the X Corporation any tax deduction. Thus, this arrange-
ment could be a far more expensive method of funding than is
the method of withdrawing sufficient funds from X to purchase a
declining term policy, particularly if those funds could be with-
drawn in a deductible form. Even if these two objections do not
deter the use of a split-dollar plan, there is an additional reason
for avoiding it. Under such a plan, A and B each receives term
insurance coverage of his fellow shareholder as compensation for
services rendered (or arguably, in some cases, as a dividend). Con-
sequently, A and B may be deemed transferees for value of the insur-
ance-that is, to the extent that they recognized income, they pur-
chased that portion of the insurance coverage from the X Corporation
242. Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 11.
243. Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 Cumr. BULL. 11.
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rather than directly from the insurer; and this determination may
be made whether the policies are held by the X Corporation or by
A and B individually. But since the policy acquired by or on behalf
of A provides insurance on the life of B and vice versa, neither A
nor B qualifies for any of the exceptions2 44 to the transfer-for-value
rule. Therefore, it is quite possible that the recipient of the policy
proceeds will be required to include in his gross income the amount
of these proceeds, reduced by the amount of premiums he paid plus
the amount of income he previously recognized under the split-dol-
lar plan.245 The tax consequences of such treatment are likely to be
so severe that the risk cannot be assumed.
2. Other Means of Funding-Particular Difficulties
with the Cross-Purchase
If life insurance is not used to fund a cross-purchase, and if the
surviving shareholders do not have sufficient assets to purchase a
decedent's stock for cash, those shareholders will probably have to
give the decedent's estate their personal interest-bearing notes.240
This method has several drawbacks. First, the shareholders may
want liquid assets made available for their estates shortly after their
demise and therefore may not agree to a long-term note; second,
the surviving shareholders may not be able to provide sufficient
security that payment will be made on the note when it becomes
due; and third, the surviving shareholders must obtain the funds
needed to satisfy the note and usually those funds must be with-
drawn from the corporation with all the attendant tax problems. 47
There is one advantage, however, to using notes: since the share-
holders may withdraw funds from the corporation gradually over
a period of years, there is a greater prospect of casting the corporate
distributions in some deductible form. In sum, if the shareholders
are willing to accept the risks involved in taking individual notes
in exchange for their stock, then such a means of financing may be
desirable.
There is another problem, however, which arises in any cross-
purchase plan, and which becomes particularly acute if individual
notes are to be exchanged for a decedent's stock. That is the possi-
244. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 101(a)(2)(A), (B).
245. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(a)(2).
246. If a long-term note is given, interest will be imputed at a 5% rate [INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 483; Treas. Reg. § 1A83-1(c)(2) (1966)], unless the note bears interest of
at least 4%. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(d)(2) (1966). See note 176 supra.
247. See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
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bility that when three or more shareholders join in a cross-purchase
agreement, one of them might default. The agreement, then, should
state specifically whether or not, upon the default of one of the sur-
viving shareholders, the others will have an option to purchase the
decedent's stock which was to be sold to the defaulting shareholder,
and, if so, on what terms.
V. CONCLUSION
Buy-out agreements are an extremely useful planning device, and
a virtually endless variety of arrangements are available. Each plan
has its own peculiar advantages and disadvantages. There is no single
universally correct plan; the one to be used must be selected and
tailored to comply with the specific aims of the parties involved and
to create only those business and tax risks that the parties are willing
to assume.
Buy-out plans may create tax pitfalls which should be avoided or
at least minimized to the extent that it is feasible. For the entity pur-
chase, the principal tax problems are the accumulated earnings sur-
tax, the danger that redemptions of a decedent's stock may be treated
as essentially equivalent to a dividend, and, in some cases, those dif-
ficulties which may be caused by section 306. The cross-purchase ar-
rangement does not usually create accumulated earnings problems
or dividend problems; its principal tax difficulties are the transfer-
for-value rule when insurance funding is employed, and the con-
sequences of section 306 when the corporation is recapitalized after
the shareholder's death. The net cost of the cross-purchase arrange-
ment is usually higher than that of the entity purchase, especially
since the shareholders may have difficulty withdrawing from the
corporation in a deductible form sufficient amounts to fund the
purchase agreement. In both types of buy-out arrangements, a plan-
ner must be careful to protect against adverse estate tax conse-
quences caused by the failure to make the redemption price de-
terminative of the estate tax value of the stock.
In determining which type of buy-out plan to employ, the choice
will usually depend on a comparison of the net costs of funding, on
the relative difficulty in obtaining funds, and on both estate plan-
ning and business planning considerations. All of these factors, in
turn, reflect potential tax consequences. Thus, although tax minimi-
zation should not be the exclusive goal of a buy-out plan, tax con-
sequences must be considered in drafting the plan and will often
constitute the greatest single factor.
Many buy-out plans, particularly those funded with life insur-
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ance, greatly favor the surviving shareholders. There are usually
business and personal reasons for adopting such plans-namely,
the continuation of the business after the decedent's death and the
creation of a ready market for the sale of the decedent's stock-but
the parties should be fully apprised of the actual consequences of
their particular plan so that they can make an informed, intelligent
decision concerning its adoption.
